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The alliance partners with which a focal firm allies itself can be classified into three 
layers (vertical up-stream, horizontal, and vertical down-stream alliances) depending on 
the partners’ characteristics. In chapter 2, this thesis hypothesizes that alliance portfolios 
affecting the performance of the firm differ according to layers. It tests how alliance 
portfolio configuration variables affect the firm’s performance at vertical up-stream, 
down-stream and comprehensive alliance network levels. Chapter 3 also deals with the 
effect of the alliance portfolio configuration on the firm’s performance in the vertical 
down-stream alliance portfolio. It presents three questions. First, do the resources that are 
accessible to a focal firm affect its performance? Second, what are the relative 
capabilities between a focal firm and partners affecting the former’s performance? Lastly, 
which alliance portfolio structure, that is, one spanning structural hole versus a densely 
iv 
 
embedded network, is superior considering the relative capabilities? The 54 leading firms 
of Korean defense industry are analyzed with two–step generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimates over the period 1995–2010. In chapter 2, the results show that the 
balance between vertical up-stream and down-stream partners is important and that the 
alliance portfolio should differ depending on the vertical up-stream and down-stream 
alliance portfolios. In chapter 3, in the vertical down-stream alliance portfolio, large 
amounts of resources could improve firm performance with improved accessible resource 
measurement. Also, when constituting an alliance portfolio, a focal firm should compare 
its capabilities with a candidate partner firm, and the alliance portfolio structure should 
different according to the relative capabilities of a focal firm and partners. These findings 
provide managers with good intuitions for the detailed analysis and specification of 
strategy for the composition of alliance portfolios. 
 
Keywords: alliance portfolio, comprehensive alliance portfolio, vertical up-stream 
alliance portfolio, vertical down-stream alliance portfolio, two-step generalized 
method of moments (GMM), Specialization-Systematization Legislations 
 




Abstract ........................................................................................................................ iii 
Contents ......................................................................................................................... v 
List of Tables ...............................................................................................................viii 
List of Figures................................................................................................................. x 
Chapter 1. Introduction ............................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Background ................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Research motivation ...................................................................................... 5 
1.2.1 Previous research stream of Korean Defense industry .................................... 5 
1.2.2 Specialization-Systematization Legislations .................................................. 6 
1.3 Research scope ............................................................................................ 10 
1.4 Contributions ............................................................................................... 11 
Chapter 2. Comparison of the alliance portfolio with respect to layers and firm 
performance  ................................................................................................................ 13 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 13 
2.2 Theory and hypotheses ................................................................................ 16 
2.2.1 The number of alliances and number of partners .......................................... 16 
2.2.2 Spanning structural holes ............................................................................ 19 
2.2.3 Network diversity ....................................................................................... 21 
2.3 Method ........................................................................................................ 24 
vi 
 
2.3.1 The effects of alliance ................................................................................. 24 
2.3.2 Data ........................................................................................................... 25 
2.3.3 Dependent variables .................................................................................... 29 
2.3.4 Explanatory variables.................................................................................. 29 
2.3.5 Controls...................................................................................................... 35 
2.4 Data analysis ............................................................................................... 36 
2.5 Results ........................................................................................................ 37 
2.5.1 Tests of hypotheses ..................................................................................... 47 
2.6 Discussion ................................................................................................... 48 
Chapter 3. External resources, relative capabilities, spanning structural holes, and firm 
performance  ................................................................................................................ 56 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 56 
3.2 Theory and hypotheses ................................................................................ 59 
3.2.1 The accessible resources ............................................................................. 59 
3.2.2 Relative innovativeness of a focal firm compared with partner firms ............ 61 
3.2.3 Relative reputation of a focal firm compared with partner firms ................... 62 
3.2.4 Relative bargaining power of a focal firm compared with partner firms ........ 62 
3.2.5 Contingencies exerted by spanning structural hole ....................................... 63 
3.3 Method ........................................................................................................ 64 
3.3.1 Data ........................................................................................................... 64 
3.3.2 Dependent variables .................................................................................... 65 
vii 
 
3.3.3 Explanatory variables.................................................................................. 65 
3.3.4 Controls...................................................................................................... 69 
3.4 Data analysis ............................................................................................... 69 
3.5 Results ........................................................................................................ 71 
3.5.1 Tests of hypotheses ..................................................................................... 80 
3.6 Discussion ................................................................................................... 81 
Chapter 4. Conclusions and Implications ................................................................... 88 
4.1 Summary of results ...................................................................................... 88 
4.2 Implications and directions of future research .............................................. 91 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................. 95 





List of Tables 
Table 1.1 Existing conceptualizations of alliance portfolio ........................... 2 
Table 1.2. Transition Process of the Specialization-Systematization 
Legislations ................................................................................................ 8 
Table 1.3. The scope of this thesis ............................................................... 11 
Table 2.1. The firm ratio of participants in technological alliances in 
defense specialized sectors .................................................................... 26 
Table 2.2. The firm ratio of participants in technological alliance between 
main and general defense sectors .......................................................... 26 
Table 2.3. Means, standard deviations, and correlations for the 
comprehensive alliance portfolio............................................................ 38 
Table 2.4. Means, standard deviations, and correlations for the up-stream 
alliance portfolio ...................................................................................... 40 
Table 2.5. Means, standard deviations, and correlations for the down-
stream alliance ......................................................................................... 42 
Table 2.6. Two-step GMM estimates for the comprehensive alliance 
portfolio .................................................................................................... 44 
Table 2.7. Two-step GMM estimates for the up-stream alliance portfolio
 ................................................................................................................... 45 
Table 2.8. Two-step GMM estimates for the down-stream alliance 
portfolio .................................................................................................... 46 
Table 2.9. Summary of results of hypothesis tests ...................................... 48 
Table 2.10. Scope of layer of past studies ................................................... 50 
Table 3.1. Efficiencies comparison of firm 1 and 2 ..................................... 67 
Table 3.2. Means, standard deviations, and correlations for relative 
capabilities of partner firms and performances .................................... 72 
Table 3.3. Two–step GMM estimates for relative capabilities of partner 
firms and performances .......................................................................... 74 
Table 3.4. Means, standard deviations, and correlations for absolute 
capabilities of partner firms and performances .................................... 76 
ix 
 
Table 3.5. Two–step GMM estimates for absolute capabilities of partner 
firms and performances .......................................................................... 78 
Table 3.6. Summary on the results of hypotheses tests ............................. 81 
Table 3.7. Summary on the results of absolute capabilities of partners and 




List of Figures 
Figure 1.1. Research areas in alliance portfolio and the six prominent 
issues in alliance portfolio configuration ................................................. 4 
Figure 1.2. Hierarchical structure constituting the alliance portfolio of focal 
firms .......................................................................................................... 10 
Figure 2.1. The relationship between comprehensive alliance portfolio and 
alliance portfolio in each layer ............................................................... 14 
Figure 2.2. The scope of this chapter ........................................................... 15 
Figure 2.3. The difference between the number of alliances and partners17 
Figure 2.4. Measurement of the effect of alliance using the concept of 
network decay .......................................................................................... 24 
Figure 2.5. Alliance portfolios of several focal firms in cumulative 
comprehensive alliance network ............................................................ 27 
Figure 2.6. Cumulative vertical up-stream, horizontal, and down-stream 
alliance networks ..................................................................................... 28 
Figure 2.7. Alliance portfolios of each firm for the longitudinal analysis .. 30 
Figure 2.8. Examples of calculating the number of alliances ...................... 31 
Figure 2.9. Examples of calculating the number of partners ...................... 32 
Figure 2.10. Example of how a structural hole score changes ................... 33 
Figure 2.11. Examples of calculating network diversity ............................. 35 
Figure 2.12. The relationships between the number of alliances and 
partners .................................................................................................... 52 
Figure 2.13. The difference of ideal structure between the vertical up-
stream and down-stream alliance portfolios ......................................... 53 
Figure 2.14. Conceptual alliance strategy based on network diversity ..... 55 
Figure 3.1. The scope of this chapter ........................................................... 58 
Figure 3.2. The limitation of Stuart (2000)’s method of measuring 
accessible resources from partners ....................................................... 66 
Figure 3.3. The relative capabilities between a focal firm and a partner 
affecting firm performance positively .................................................... 82 
xi 
 
Figure 3.4. The relative capabilities between a focal firm and a partner and 
the structure of the alliance portfolio affecting firm performance 




Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Firms entering strategic alliances have become a common phenomenon in today’s 
business landscape (Contractor & Lorange, 2002; Gulati, 1998; Mani & Antia, 2006). For 
instance, Apple, the consumer electronics company, recently established a strategic 
alliance with Nuance, which has developed a cutting-edge voice recognition technology, 
to create a voice-based personal assistance application for Apple’s iPhone OS (iOS). 
Similarly, Sony announced its strategic alliance with AU Optronics (AUO), the first 
manufacturer in Taiwan to mass produce TV panels, in developing the OLED TV, a 
television that uses new light-emitting diode (LED) technology. Meanwhile, Toyota is 
collaborating with BMW to develop a next-generation lithium-ion battery for an eco-
friendly car. Firms pursue strategic alliances to gain a competitive advantage in markets 
with increasing competition. Hence, a strategic alliance could be considered an important 
asset (Hoffmann, 2007; Kanter, 1994). 
 
In today’s business environment, most firms no longer depend on a single alliance, but 
rather maintain entire networks of alliances with different partners in order to access a 
broad range of resources (Hoffmann, 2005, 2007; Lavie, 2007; Parise & Casher, 2003; 
Wassmer, 2010). Such networks of alliances are also called “alliance portfolios,” which 
are referred to egocentric alliance networks with social network perspective in table 1.1. 
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Viewing networks of alliances in terms of portfolios is useful for analyzing the costs and 
benefits of such alliances, as an efficiently configured alliance portfolio can improve firm 
performance (Wassmer, 2010). Firms differ in the configuration of their alliance 
portfolios, and consequently differ in the external resources and capabilities they can 
access (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). A focal firm’s network of alliances can be regarded as 
an inimitable and non-substitutable resource, as well as a means to access unique 
capabilities (Wassmer & Dussauge, 2011; Zaheer & Bell, 2005).  
 
Table 1.1 Existing conceptualizations of alliance portfolio 
Study Alliance Portfolio Conceptualization 
Baum et al. (2000), Rowley et al. 
(2000) and Ozcan et al. (2009) 
A focal firm’s egocentric alliance network 
(i.e., all direct ties with partner firms) 
(social network perspective) 
Bae & Gargiulo (2004)) The set of alliances in which a firm is involved 
Doz & Hamel (1998) The set of bilateral alliances maintained by a focal firm 
George et al. (2001) A firm’s portfolio of strategic agreements or relationships 
Hoffmann (2005, 2007) All alliances of a focal firm 
Lavie (2007) A firm’s collection of direct alliances with partners 
Lavie & Miller (2008) A firm’s collection of immediate alliance partners 
Parise & Casher (2003) A firm’s network of business-partner relationships 
Reuer et al. (2002) 
A firm’s accumulated international joint venture experience 
(learning perspective) 
Reuer & Ragozzino (2006) All international joint ventures of a focal firm 
Source: Wassmer, U. (2010). Alliance portfolios: A review and research agenda. 
Journal of Management, 36(1), 143. 
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Several studies have indicated that a firm’s network of alliances influences its 
behavior and outcomes (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Powell et al., 1996; Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 
1997). Gulati et al. (2000) suggested that the behaviors and performances of firms can be 
more fully understood by examining the network of relationships in which they are 
embedded. The reason why it should be understood that the alliance in terms of the 
overall portfolio is able to be expressed as the costs and benefits function, and also that 
efficiently configured alliance portfolio can improve firm performance (Wassmer, 2010). 
Each firm’s alliance portfolio configuration is different, and so are the external resources 
or capabilities which they can access from the portfolio (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). As a 
result, research has begun to examine the influence of certain network characteristics on 
firms’ abilities to realize potential benefits (Das & Teng, 2002) and has paid significant 
attention to the phenomenon of alliance networks from different perspectives (Goerzen, 
2007). In spite of the growing consensus that networks matter, however, the specific 
effects of the different elements of network structure on organizational performance 
remain unclear (Ahuja, 2000). Thus, the effect of network of alliances on individual firm 
performance is still a critical question for both managers and scholars (Dyer & Singh, 
1998; Goerzen & Beamish, 2005; Gulati et al., 2000; Koka & Prescott, 2002). 
 
According to Wassmer (2010), alliance portfolios are a relatively new research area in 
the broader field of strategic alliances. Themes in this area cluster around three major 
issues, namely the emergence, configuration, and management of alliance portfolios. 
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Chapter 2 in this thesis examines the three issues, specifically, portfolio size (i.e., number 
of alliances, number of partners), the role of alliance partners (i.e., diversity of partners, 
capabilities of partners), and structural portfolio characteristics (i.e., spanning structural 
holes) with multi-dimensional views. The third chapter is about the role of the alliance 
partners and structural characteristics affecting firm performance in vertical down-stream 
alliance portfolio. These specific items are indicated by the shaded areas in figure 1.1. 
This new research perspective will help overcome the dyadic perspective, and help 
determine enduring relationship patterns among firms in strategic alliances (Lavie, 2007).  
 
 




Source: Wassmer, U. (2010). Alliance portfolios: A review and research agenda.
 Journal of Management, 36(1), 141. 
 
1.2 Research motivation  
1.2.1 Previous research stream of Korean Defense industry 
Recent scholarly interest in the Korean defense industry, designated by the 
government as a future growth sector, is the main reason for this study’s focus on the 
defense industry in Korea. Previous studies on the defense industry can roughly be 
categorized into those at the national and industry levels (J. G. Kim, 2009). First, the 
studies at national level take a macroscopic approach. The main studies are as follows (S. 
H. Gu, 1998; S. G. Min, 1996): a study on the time-periodic characteristics of the 
development process in the defense industry prior to Park, Chung-hee’s government (S. B. 
Hong, 1993), a study comparing the Korean defense industry’s characteristics with those 
of the Taiwan defense industry, that is, focusing on foreign environments (Nolan, 1986); a 
study of the industry’s overall characteristics focusing on its domestic environment, and 
so on. Second, the studies at industry level take a microscopic approach to the defense 
industry’s development in line with government policies. The main studies are as follows: 
studies on strategies to overcome the downturn in the defense industry (W. S. Chae & B. 
O. Gil, 2009; S. P. Hong, 2007), which look at how to encourage the defense industry or 
encourage exports when the defense industry is experiencing a downturn; studies on the 
impact of specialization-systematization legislations, which were used to regulate the 
6 
 
defense industry, on the defense industry after the 1980s, and discussions of the follow-up 
measures taken after these legislations were abolished in 2009 (J. H. Kim, 2008; K. J. 
Kwon et al., 2007).  
 
In summary, until now, studies on Korea’s defense industry concentrated on the 
development strategies and the features of the industry at the national level, and on the 
institutional development plan at the industry level. In other words, Korea’s defense 
industry has been viewed as an industry under the control of the country’s institutions. 
This thesis looks at the defense industry at the firm level, and seeks to discover the effects 
of a strategic alliance portfolio. From this perspective, this study deviates from past 
studies, as well as presenting future growth strategies for the defense industry in the wake 
of the abolishment of the specialization-systematization legislations. 
 
1.2.2 Specialization-Systematization Legislations 
Meanwhile, the specialization-systematization legislations that supported government 
policies had a significant influence on the defense industry (K. Y. Kim, 2005). The 
background to these legislations is as follows: the development process of Korea’s 
defense industry entered a new phase in the 1980s following successes over the 1970s. 
The defense industry, which the regime of President Park, Chung-hee did much to 
develop during the 1970s, faced a recession throughout the 1990s after going into decline 
during the 1980s (J. G. Kim, 2011). The defense industry’s decline, on the whole, was due 
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to the government policy of importing foreign advanced weapons systems for short-term 
augmentation of the country’s military power, rather than encouraging domestic R&D, as 
well as the government’s dependence on U.S. military power. During this period, defense 
firms could no longer rely on government support and they saw the government reduce 
preferential measures for them. Hence, defense firms needed to explore new measures to 
ensure their survival by conducting their own R&D (J. G. Kim, 2011). The Minister of 
National Defense (MND) established the specialization-systematization legislations 
targeting existing defense products and firms to prevent overlapping investments and to 
promote technology development, as defense firms engaged in an intensely competitive 
struggle for survival. The specialization-systematization legislations classified 
specialization-systematization firms by areas, detailed areas, complete equipment, and 
components or parts of items depending on the required technologies and dedicated 
facilities, and gave priority to those firms participating in weapon systems acquisition 
programs through domestic R&D or technology acquisition. The government used the 
specialization-systematization legislations to promote its policy of fostering a technology-
driven defense industry. Additionally, the legislations served not only to boost the 
competitiveness of defense firms, but also helped with rationalizing the management of 
independent weapons systems development and production capacities, which were 
necessary for self-reliant national defense (K. Y. Kim, 2005). The legislations were first 
introduced in 1983, and were developed through four rounds of revision as shown in table 
1.2 below.  
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Table 1.2. Transition Process of the Specialization-Systematization Legislations 
Revision 
Period 
(Month of revision) 
Operating System 
Number of  







Designation of main & 


















2 specialized firms,  










Division into monopoly, 
oligopoly, depending on 
weapons system 












Division into monopoly or 
oligopoly system, 
depending on weapons 
system 
Restricted to core 
strategic weapons 
Source: Kim, K. Y. (2005). Roh, Moo-hyun government's defense industrial pol
icy: Focusing on the Specialization-Systematization Legislations. The collection of t




At the core of the specialization-systematization legislations of the Chun, Doo-Hwan 
administration was the designating of main and sub-specialized firms. The Roh, Tae-Woo 
administration changed the focus of primary policy from one of a monopolistic 
production system to that of a competitive system in which several firms participated. 
However, the Kim, Young-Sam administration changed the legislations to enforce 
restricted competition due to the existing system’s harmful effects of encouraging a 
scramble for survival among established firms. The Kim, Dae-Jung administration 
divided the defense industry into monopoly, oligopoly, and competition systems, 
depending on the weapons systems, in the third and fourth revisions. Further, most fields 
were converted to the competition system except that it is really needed to be maintained. 
In 2009, the Roh, Moo-hyun administration abolished these legislations in keeping with 
the principles of a market economy. In other words, defense firms were put into an 
infinite competition system. These institutional changes thus gave evidence of the 
strenuous efforts to decide on a policy for the defense industry, leading to a choice being 
made between a system of protection or competition.  
 
The results of the study on the strategic alliance portfolio and firm performance 
during the period of government protection clearly indicate the importance of a strategic 
alliance portfolio with external partner firms. Therefore, this thesis can guide the future 
growth strategy of defense firms as it provides a reminder of the importance of external 
partners at the firm level. 
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1.3 Research scope 
In many previous studies, scholars have tried to understand alliance portfolios as 
fragmentary layers. For example, horizontal alliance portfolios (Ahuja (2000), Stuart 
(2000), Zaheer & Bell (2005)) and comprehensive alliance portfolios (Baum (2000)) were 
investigated in this way. Although some studies were undertaken from the perspective of 
the concept of layers, they dealt with the relationship between firm performance and the 
number of alliances, not including other network properties (Haeussler & Patzelt, 2008; 
Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006; Silverman & Baum, 2002). In contrast, chapter 2 introduces 
four variables: the number of alliances, the number of partners, structural holes, and 
network diversity, within vertical up-stream, down-stream, and comprehensive alliance 
portfolios, in order to compare each with the other. It will discuss how the strategies differ 
at each of the layers represented in figure 1.2.  
 
 
Figure 1.2. Hierarchical structure constituting the alliance portfolio of focal firms 
 
Chapter 3 also concentrates on the technological vertical down-stream alliance 
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portfolio of Korean defense firms, with the aim of discussing the external resources, the 
characteristic differences between a focal firm and its partners, and structural hole 
spanning in vertical down-stream alliance portfolios. Alliance portfolios of two levels are 
excluded because it is hard to define the characteristics of partners in vertical up-stream 
alliance portfolios. Also, horizontal alliances of Korean defense firms are hard to find 
since the firms are segmented and specialized.  
The scope of this thesis is summarized in below table 1.3. 
 













The role of  

















The role of the alliance 
partners 
  ○  
 
1.4 Contributions 
In chapter 2, the results show that the size variables of an alliance portfolio that are 
not significant in a comprehensive alliance network or in one layer can be significant in 
another layer. Also, the spanning of a structural hole may differ in up-stream and down-
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stream alliance portfolios. In other words, the concept of layers provides a more specific 
grasp of the significant factors. Put differently, “ambidexterity in technological alliance 
portfolios” between these two layers can exist. Also, the balance between vertical up-
stream and down-stream partners is important. In chapter 3, the role of the alliance 
partners in vertical down-stream alliance portfolio can be summarized in terms of three 
factors. First, large amounts of resources could improve firm performance with improved 
accessible resource measurement. Second, relative innovativeness, reputation, and 
bargaining power between a focal firm and its partners affect firm performance differently. 
This result gives a more fine-grained intuition than the argument of previous studies that 
simply innovative or reputational partners are better. This study aims to show not simply 
that good partners are better, but that superior performance lies in the capability 
relationship between a focal firm and partner firms. Lastly, the alliance portfolio structure 
should be different depending on the relative capability (innovativeness, reputation, and 
bargaining power) between a focal firm and a partner firm. In the debate about the 
linkage of social capital and communal social capital, the superior performance structures 







Chapter 2. Comparison of the alliance 
portfolio with respect to layers and firm 
performance 
2.1 Introduction 
The alliance partners of a focal firm can be classified into three levels (vertical up-
stream alliances, horizontal alliances, vertical down-stream alliances) depending on the 
partner characteristics (Baum et al., 2000). These levels are expressible as layers, as 
shown in figure 2.1, in which an alliance portfolio of focal firms, represented by 
triangular nodes, in figure 2.1–①, means an egocentric network, and an alliance network 
means the whole picture of the relationships among nodes in the network in figure 2.1–②. 
The figure shows the relationships between the comprehensive alliance portfolio and the 
alliance portfolios that the three firms have in each layer: see figures 2.1– , , ③ ④ ⑤. This 
representation makes clear why the benefits from each layer are different. A vertical up-
stream alliance means entering partnerships with up-stream organizations in the value 
chain in order to obtain research knowledge from partners such as universities, research 
institutes, and government laboratories (Silverman & Baum, 2002). Vertical up-stream 
alliances provide opportunities to access essential, valuable, scientific, and advanced 
technical knowledge in developing new technologies (George et al., 2002; Powell et al., 
1996; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006). Horizontal alliances involve partnerships with firms 
on the same level in the value chain, and provide opportunities for joint development of 
14 
 
new products or services (Perry et al., 2004). The defense industry is classified in this 
layer. A down-stream alliance is a partnership with firms that lie down-stream in the value 
chain. Firms make these alliances not to obtain new knowledge, but to acquire 
complementary assets (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006; Silverman & Baum, 2002). 
Sometimes, these assets are very valuable or ones those focal firms do not possess 




Figure 2.1. The relationship between comprehensive alliance portfolio and alliance 
portfolio in each layer 
 
Figure 2.2 summarizes the scope of this chapter. The number of alliances and the 
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number of partners are included in the network size issue; structural holes are included 
amongst structural alliance portfolio characteristics, and network diversity is included in 
the role of the alliance partners among the six alliance portfolio configuration research 
area as introduced in chapter 1 (Wassmer, 2010). Horizontal alliance portfolios are 
omitted because relationships among defense industry firms are rarely easily identifiable, 
since defense industry technology is segmented and specialized. Two dependent variables 
(gross profit on sales and net income) are used. 
 
 




Common hypotheses are formulated relating vertical up-stream, down-stream, and 
comprehensive alliance portfolios in terms of four variables derived from previous 
studies, and discuss the results from the perspective of the corresponding three analytic 
levels. This chapter shows that the alliance portfolio variables that are not significant at 
one analytic level can be significant at another. In other words, the concept of layers 
provides a more specific grasp of the significant factors: “ambidexterity in technological 
alliance portfolios” between two layers can exist. Further, the balance between vertical 
up-stream and down-stream partners is important. These results give managers sound 
intuitions for the detailed construction of alliance portfolios.  
 
In the remainder of this paper, hypotheses are established, describe our methods, and 
outline our results. In the sections on theory and hypotheses, identical hypotheses are 
presented for the comprehensive, vertical up-stream, and down-stream alliance portfolios, 
and the findings are compared in the results sections. Our conclusions are discussed in 
light of the statistical results with implications for managers and scholars. 
 
2.2 Theory and hypotheses 
2.2.1 The number of alliances and number of partners 
In previous research dealing with the size issue, the two variables, the number of 
alliances, and the number of partners, have not been strictly distinguished. In this article, 
these two variables are distinguished rigidly. A prerequisite for any precise distinction 
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between the two should be preceded by the identification of partners. The reason for this 
distinction is that the two variables can move very differently, as figure 2.3 shows. In (a) 
the focal firm has five alliances, but only one partner, whereas in (e) the two variables 
have the same value, 5. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. The difference between the number of alliances and partners 
 
There are countless studies on the number of alliances and corporate performance. 
Common to all these is the argument that increasing the number of alliances affects 
performance positively (e.g., Baum et al., 2000; Deeds & Hill, 1996; Oliver, 2001; Owen-
Smith & Powell, 2004; Tsai, 2001).  
 
The number of alliances was also used as a proxy for social capital (Chen & 
Ronowski, 2006) and for positional centrality in a network, which provides several 
benefits (Freeman, 1979). Through their central positioning, firms increase their abilities 
to access resources (Tsai, 2001), which can create new opportunities to enter new markets. 
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From a knowledge-based perspective, a central position favors better performance (Kogut 
& Zander, 1992; Tsai, 2000). In accordance with the received view highlighting the 
positive aspects of the number of alliances, the following hypothesis is proposed. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The more alliances a focal firm has, the better it performs.  
 
In the study of alliance portfolios, fewer studies exist about the number of partners. 
Scholars may have thought the two concepts were too similar to be worth distinguishing. 
As mentioned before, however, these two concepts are distinct and different (Wassmer, 
2010). The partner firms of a focal firm affect important decisions (Davis, 1996). A focal 
firm’s information may be enriched by having many partners, and this information may 
affect the firm’s practice (Davis & Greve, 1997; Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989; 
Haunschild, 1993). In institutional theory, since a focal firm is affected by the culture and 
discipline of partner firms, it can follow its partners' advantages (Powell & DiMaggio, 
1991). In addition, from a learning perspective, partner firms can affect a focal firm, since 
partner firms can be assume the role of teacher (Levitt and March 1988; Powell, 1990; 
Uzzi, 1996). Learning from several sources can lead to combinations of good or superior 
information (Powell et al., 1996; Stuart & Podolny, 2000), and affect the survival and 
growth of a focal firm (Podolny et al., 1996; Uzzi, 1996). In accordance with the received 




Hypothesis 2a: The more partners a focal firm has, the better it performs. 
 
On the other hand, increasing the number of alliances and the number of partners 
could affect the firm’s performance negatively. From the resource-based view, accessing 
network resources through multiple simultaneous strategic alliances with different 
partners can express the alliance’s benefits and costs function (Wassmer & Dussauge, 
2011). An alliance portfolio maintaining the focal firm and its existing alliances and 
partners can increase the costs, and thus reduce the value. In other words, efficiency and 
inefficiency in the alliance portfolio could coexist. Therefore, increasing the number of 
the alliances and partners could produce a negative effect. Accordingly, the following 
hypotheses are proposed. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: The more alliances a focal firm has, the worse it performs. 
Hypothesis 2b: The more partners a focal firm has, the worse it performs. 
 
2.2.2 Spanning structural holes 
Information travels not only through proximate ties in networks but also through the 
structure of the network itself (Gulati, 1998). There are two main accounts of our 
understanding of social capital: one account sees social capital as linking and the other 
views social capital as communal (Wu & Wei, 2004). While the stream of linking social 
capital emphasizes the benefits of a focal firm in a brokering position in an open network, 
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the other stream of communal social capital stresses the benefits of embeddedness of a 
focal firm in a closed network (Coleman, 1988, 1990; Granovetter, 1985). Much previous 
research, based on the structural hole theory of Burt (1992), has underlined the 
importance of spanning structural holes (Bae & Gargiulo, 2004; Dyer et al., 2008; Zaheer 
& Bell, 2005).  
 
Burt (1992) suggested that spanning a structural hole is favorable for gaining a control 
advantage over competitors and obtaining non-redundant information. Through spanning 
a structural hole, a focal firm enriches resources by achieving greater access to mutually 
unconnected partners. Bae & Gargiulo (2004) argued that a firm’s structural hole 
spanning positively affects its return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Zaheer 
& Bell (2005) showed that spanning a structural hole is positively related to a firm’s 
market share. In particular, they emphasized that the benefits of spanning structural holes 
for the firm’s performance derives from the availability of new information. In 
accordance with the received view highlighting the positive aspects of spanning structural 
holes, the following hypothesis is proposed. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Spanning a structural hole enhances a focal firm’s performance. 
 
According to the communal social capital view emphasizing densely embedded 
networks, there are completely contrary effects. The social structures, where a focal firm 
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has numerous interconnected partners, are called closed networks and are favorable for 
the firm (Coleman, 1988, 1990; Walker et al., 1997). Coleman (1988) stated that optimal 
social structure can be generated by building interconnections. In addition, a focal firm 
obtains benefits through the exchange of information, the reduction of opportunism, and 
the lowering of monitoring costs depending on trust within this dense network (Zaheer & 
Venkatraman, 1995). The connectivity among a firm’s partners leads to more productive 
collaboration from the viewpoint of resource sharing and access to new information 
(Ahuja, 2000). In accordance with the received view highlighting the positive aspects of 
densely embedded networks, the following hypothesis is proposed. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: A densely embedded network of a focal firm enhances the firm’s 
performance. 
 
2.2.3 Network diversity 
Understanding the effect caused by network diversity is necessary a deeper 
comprehension of the effect of alliance portfolios (Wassmer, 2010). Since this duplication 
makes the alliance portfolio inefficient, purchasing diversity is important (Baum et al., 
2000; Goerzen, 2007). Baum et al. (2000) stress the importance of the diverse partners, 
which may yield more diverse resources, information, and capabilities with less cost. 
Existing empirical studies have argued that heterogeneity relative to the alliance portfolio 
affects the firm’s performance positively (Faems et al., 2010; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; 
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Nieto & Santamaría, 2007; Pelled et al., 1999; Rodan & Galunic, 2004). This diversity 
makes a focal firm broaden the range of its viewpoint, enhance its resource diversification, 
and improve problem-solving skills (Hambrick et al., 1996). In the present study, 
diversity may arise from many perspectives. There are diversity of organizations 
(universities, research institutes, and government laboratories) in the vertical up-stream 
alliance portfolio, and diversity of industries in the vertical down-stream alliance 
portfolio. In addition, there are diversity of layers (vertical up/down-stream) and diversity 
of organizations and industries in the comprehensive alliance portfolio. In accordance 
with the received view highlighting the positive aspects of network diversity, the 
following several hypotheses are proposed.  
 
Hypothesis 4a-1: The diversity of organizations in the vertical up-stream alliance 
portfolio of a focal firm enhances the firm’s performance. 
 
Hypothesis 4a-2: The diversity of industries in the vertical down-stream alliance 
portfolio of a focal firm enhances the firm’s performance. 
 
Hypothesis 4a-3: The diversity of layers in the comprehensive alliance portfolio of a 





Hypothesis 4a-4: The diversity of organizations and industries in the comprehensive 
alliance portfolio of a focal firm enhances the firm’s performance. 
 
On the other hand, diversity could be the cause of disruptions for a focal firm 
(Hambrick et al., 1996; Miller et al., 1998). While diversity provides a focal firm with 
wide range of resources, obstacles or barriers could arise in exchanging information. For 
instance, heterogeneity, such as different cultures, or a firm’s terminology, paradigms, and 
goals, might not foster trust and emotional consistency for the focal firm (Goerzen & 
Beamish, 2005). Combining two different companies might not feed into the performance 
and innovation, but become a liability (Hambrick et al., 1996). For these reasons, the 
following contrary hypotheses are proposed. 
 
Hypothesis 4b-1: The diversity of organizations in the vertical up-stream alliance 
portfolio of a focal firm reduces the firm’s performance. 
 
Hypothesis 4b-2: The diversity of industries in the vertical down-stream alliance 
portfolio of a focal firm reduces the firm’s performance. 
 
Hypothesis 4b-3: The diversity of layers in the comprehensive alliance portfolio of a 




Hypothesis 4b-4: The diversity of organizations and industries in the comprehensive 
alliance portfolio of a focal firm reduces the firm’s performance. 
 
2.3 Method 
2.3.1 The effects of alliance 
The effects of alliance have not been clearly defined (Wassmer, 2010). Most previous 
studies measured the alliance performance effects one year after their inception (Ahuja, 
2000; Koka & Prescott, 2002, 2008; Padula, 2008; Powell et al., 1996; Zaheer & Bell, 
2005). The network decay effect where the liability of new ties is evident from slower 
decay in older relationships is adopted (Burt, 2000). This concept was used by Stuart 
(2000), in which the effect of an alliance is assumed to weaken over time during a five-
year period. For example, five years prior to an alliance, the effect’s weight is 0.2; four 
years prior, it is 0.4; three years prior, it is 0.6, and so on, defining this the decay effect. 
 
 





The technological alliances of 54 leading firms among 95 Korean defense firms, 
designated under the Korean government or Defense Acquisition Program Administration 
(DAPA), are investigated. Co-patenting is used as an indicator of technological alliance 
(Lecocq & Van Looy, 2009).  
 
The defense firms can be divided according to two categories. First, it is divided along 
defense specialized sectors, that is maneuver, firepower, ammunition, battleship, air & 
guidance, communications electronics, chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR), and 
others. This division is based on battlefield functions. Second, the firms can be divided by 
main and general defense sectors. This division is based on how much the firms are 
concentrating on the defense products. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show how many firms are 
participating in the alliance depending on the two categories. The firm’s technological 
alliance ratio does not vary much in defense specialized sectors. However, when the firms 
are divided into main and general defense firms, the difference is larger. It seems to be 
related with the size of firms. Whereas the ratio of large firms in general defense firms is 
15.8%, 6 among 38 firms, the ratio of large firms in main defense firms is 61.4%, 35 




Table 2.1. The firm ratio of participants in technological alliances in defense specialized 
sectors 
Specialized sector 








Maneuver 14 8 57.1% 
Firepower 13 7 53.8% 
Ammunition 8 5 62.5% 
Battleship 12 8 66.7% 
Air & guidance 16 9 56.3% 
Communications electronics 17 7 41.2% 
Chemical, biological,  
and radiological (CBR) 
3 1 33.3% 
Others 12 9 75.0% 
 
Table 2.2. The firm ratio of participants in technological alliance between main and 
general defense sectors 
 Division 
Number of 
defense firms (A) 
Number of participating 




Main defense firms 57 42 73.7% 
General defense firms 38 12 31.6% 
 
The year of technological alliance was assigned as the date of application, rather than 
the date of granting (Baum et al., 2000). The technological alliance data were obtained 
from the Korea Institute of Patent Information (KIPRIS) online patent search; from this, 
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492 alliances were found from 1995 to 2009, with each alliance involving two to six 
participants. Figure 2.5 shows cumulative comprehensive alliance network from 1995 to 
2009. It shows how overall alliance portfolio configurations are consisted. In the 
comprehensive alliance network, 54 defense firms and 168 partner firms are identified. 
The red nodes indicate defense firms, and the blue ones do other industries’ firms. If it is 
seen by the aspects of alliance portfolio, diverse alliance portfolio configurations are 
found in the figure 2.5.  
  
 
Figure 2.5. Alliance portfolios of several focal firms in cumulative comprehensive 
alliance network 
 
This research represents the concept of layers according to the characteristics of 
partner firms. So, it is important to separate each layer, to show how overall alliance 
portfolio configurations are constituted. Furthermore, the separate figures will give 
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intuitions whether adopting the layer concept is proper. Figure 2.6 shows cumulative 
alliance networks with respect to vertical up-stream, horizontal, and down-stream 
alliances between defense firms and other firms. Just as above, the triangular nodes 
indicate defense firms, and the circle ones denote firms in other industries. Horizontal 
alliances of Korean defense firms are hard to find from figure 2.6–  ② since the firms are 
segmented and specialized. Through this figure, the scope of this study is limited to the 








To measure the decay effect of the alliances, their financial data was collected from 
the Korea Investors Service Value (KIS-Value) database for 2000–2010. 
 
2.3.3 Dependent variables 
To measure the performance of the 54 leading Korean defense firms, two variables are 
used: gross profit on sales1, net income2 of current year database for 2000–2010. The 
two variables indicate profitability of firm. 
 
2.3.4 Explanatory variables 
For the longitudinal analysis, 11 × 3 = 33 cumulative adjacency matrices for 1995–
2009 with decay effect are set up to measure the financial and innovation effects for 
2000–2010. For example, figure 2.7 represents 2004–2008 networks with decay effect 
affecting the performance in 2009 of comprehensive alliances, vertical up-stream alliance 
and vertical down-stream alliance networks. The maximum value of the alliances is 12.4, 
and the minimum value is 0.2. The red nodes represent defense firms. The explanatory 
variables, the number of alliances, the number of partners, structural holes, and network 
diversity, are measured in this setting each year. 
 
                                            
1 Gross profit on sales is the difference between revenue and the cost of making a product or providing a 
service. 




Figure 2.7. Alliance portfolios of each firm for the longitudinal analysis 
 
2.3.4.1 The number of alliances 
This variable is based on the degree centrality proposed by Freeman (1979), which 
measures the number of ties of a node. Ties can be defined as the weighted value between 
a set of two nodes that represent the firms. The single tie strength increases from 0.2 to 
1.0 with the decay effect. The matrix At represents 33 adjacency matrices that affect the 
performance at t. Then, the number of alliances of firm i affecting performance in year t 
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can be calculated as follows: 1 2
t t t









  ···································· Eq. (1)  
 
Suppose the alliance portfolio configuration with the decreasing effect is composed as 
demonstrated in figure 2.8. The Figure shows that there are two alliances with thick ties 
and one alliance with a thin one. From this information, 9 alliances are found affecting 
the performance of focal firm (a) at t, and there are 5 alliances affecting the performance 
of focal firm (b) at the same periods.  
 
 
Figure 2.8. Examples of calculating the number of alliances 
 
2.3.4.2 The number of partners 
The number of partners of a focal firm is represented by the number of nodes to which 
a node is adjacent regardless of the strength of the ties. From the adjacency matrix At , 
the number of partners that a focal firm is connected can be calculated as the sum of the 
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indicator function I . It is the sum of the row in the matrix At counting only non-zero 




I w where- =å  
[ ] 1
[ ] 0 for constant
I x c if x c
I x c if x c c
= = =
= = ¹
  ······ Eq. (2)  
 
Suppose that the alliance portfolio configuration with the decreasing effect is 
composed as demonstrated in figure 2.9. As mentioned earlier, the number of alliances 
with thick and thin ties is 2 and 1, respectively. The number of partners of firm (a) is 7 
and that of firm (b) is 5. It is important to note that the tie strength does not affect these 
two values.  
 
 
Figure 2.9. Examples of calculating the number of partners 
 
2.3.4.3 Structural holes 
The same equation as in Burt (1992) is used to calculate the structural hole score 
considering the decay effect (Borgatti et al., 2002; Zaheer & Bell, 2005). The more 
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unconnected partners a focal firm has, the higher its structural hole score. The equation is 





(Structural hole) 1 1 ( )
n n n
t
i ij ij iq qj
j j q
i j i j q i j
C p p p
= = =
¹ ¹ ¹





equals the strength ratio of direct ties from to















Figure 2.10 shows how a structural hole score changes. As the number of partners of a 
focal firm increases, so does its structural hole score. However, as the number of a firm’s 
redundant partners increases, its structural hole score decreases.  
 
 
Figure 2.10. Example of how a structural hole score changes 
 
2.3.4.4 Network diversity 
The diversity has classified partner firms from several perspectives. In vertical up-
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stream alliance portfolios, it is classified as three organizations, such as universities, 
research institutes, and government laboratories. In vertical down-stream alliance 
portfolios, it is classified as diverse industries based on 2-digit SIC codes. There are also 
diversity of layers (vertical up-stream and down-stream alliance partners) and diversity of 
organizations and industries in the comprehensive alliance portfolio. 
 
The measure is a variation of the Blau’s heterogeneity index with the decay effect 
(Koka & Prescott, 2008). If a focal firm forms an alliance network with several industrial 
partners, its network diversity increases. The equation is defined as: 
 
2(Blau's heterogeneity index) 1 ( )t ti ikk P= -å   ·················· Eq. (4)  
where  
t
ikP  is the proportion of partner firms in the k category of firm i at t year performance. 
 
Suppose that the alliance portfolio configuration with the decreasing effect is 
composed as demonstrated in figure 2.11. The network diversity score of firm (a) is [1- 
{(2/6)2 + (2/6)2 + (2/6)2}] = 0.67 where there are six partners with three industrial clusters. 
The network diversity score of firm (b) is [1 - {(3/7)2 + (4/7)2}] = 0.49 where there are 
seven partners with two industrial clusters. The less a focal firm is concentrated in the 




Figure 2.11. Examples of calculating network diversity 
 
2.3.5 Controls 
First, past performance is controlled. Firms that have been good performers in the past 
are likely also to do well in the future (Tsai, 2001). Thus, past performance measures are 
included for previous years (1999–2009). Second, debt-equity ratio is also controlled (Y. 
M. Kim, 2005). The debt-equity ratio is debt divided by equity. Third, firm age is also 
considered as a control (Goerzen, 2007; Zaheer & Bell, 2005). Firms that have been in 
existence longer are more likely to perform better because of numerous advantages, 
including an established reputation, brand value and recognition, and developed social 
networks (Zaheer & Bell, 2005). Firm age was calculated by counting the number of 
years since incorporation. Fourth, the internal capability of firms is also controlled (Lee et 
al., 2001; Oliva et al., 2011). This chapter concentrates on the impact of external effects, 
so the firms’ own internal capability is controlled using the values of the cumulative 
number of patents of the previous five years to represent recent internal capability. Lastly, 




2.4 Data analysis 
The data are unbalanced longitudinal data sets. The models are estimated using the two-
step generalized method of moments (GMM) as in Arellano and Bond (1991), which 
involves transforming the equation into first differences. It also uses lagged values of the 
endogenous variables as instruments. This procedure to obtain estimates is used for the 
dynamic longitudinal model, using STATA, version 11.0. This methodology should 
satisfy two tests: the Sargan test and the second-order serial correlation test. The Sargan 
test is used for over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators, while AR(2) tests 
for second-order serial correlation. The baseline model is introduced first, and then added 
four variables for the complete version. 
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Tables 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 present the correlation matrix and the descriptive statistics for 
the three datasets, while Tables 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8 show the standardized coefficients for the 
explanatory variables. No model encountered problems regarding over-identifying 





Table 2.3. Means, standard deviations, and correlations for the comprehensive alliance portfolio 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1.Gross profit on sales 1,956.07 4,554.46 1.00 
        
2.Net income 565.03 3,079.69 0.83*** 1.00 
       
3.Debt- Equity ratio 57.45 18.69 0.18*** 0.01 1.00 
      
4.Age 24.75 16.93 0.16*** 0.13** -0.07 1.00 
     
5.Internal capability 161.77 298.50 0.65*** 0.41*** 0.19*** -0.03 1.00 
    
6.Number of alliances 4.45 8.67 0.20*** 0.16*** 0.01 0.02 0.23*** 1.00 
   
7.Number of partners 2.63 2.54 0.53*** 0.36*** 0.15** 0.29*** 0.47*** 0.55*** 1.00 
  
8.Structural hole 0.21 0.33 0.46*** 0.28*** 0.10 0.21*** 0.45*** 0.28*** 0.75*** 1.00 
 
9.Diversity of layers 0.18 0.23 0.41*** 0.26*** 0.15 0.16*** 0.29*** 0.45*** 0.68*** 0.66*** 1.00 
10.Diversity of pub. institutes & 
industries 
0.28 0.32 0.43*** 0.26*** 0.16*** 0.29*** 0.38*** 0.43*** 0.79*** 0.78*** 0.82*** 
11.Year 2000 0.05 0.21 0.00 -0.05 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.03 
12.Year 2001 0.06 0.23 -0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 
13.Year 2002 0.06 0.25 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.08 0.00 
14.Year 2003 0.08 0.28 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 
15.Year 2004 0.09 0.29 -0.06 -0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 
16.Year 2005 0.10 0.29 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 
17.Year 2006 0.11 0.31 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 
18.Year 2007 0.10 0.31 0.00 0.04 0.03 -0.06 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.04 0.00 
19.Year 2008 0.11 0.31 0.06 0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.05 




Variable 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1.Gross profit on sales 
           
2.Net income 
           
3.Debt- Equity ratio 
           
4.Age 
           
5.Internal capability 
           
6.Number of alliances 
           
7.Number of partners 
           
8.Structural hole 
           
9.Diversity of layers 
           
10.Diversity of pub. institutes & 
industries 
1.00 
          
11.Year 2000 0.04 1.00 
         
12.Year 2001 0.00 -0.05 1.00 
        
13.Year 2002 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 1.00 
       
14.Year 2003 -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 1.00 
      
15.Year 2004 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09* 1.00 
     
16.Year 2005 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10* -0.10* 1.00 
    
17.Year 2006 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.11* -0.11* -0.11** 1.00 
   
18.Year 2007 -0.01 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10** -0.11** -0.11** -0.12** 1.00 
  
19.Year 2008 0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10* -0.11* -0.11** -0.12** -0.12** 1.00 
 
20.Year 2009 0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09** -0.11** -0.11* -0.12* -0.13* -0.12* -0.12* 1.00 
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table 2.4. Means, standard deviations, and correlations for the up-stream alliance portfolio 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1.Gross profit on sales 2,512.83 5,335.52 1.00 
        
2.Net income 854.86 3,640.16 0.85*** 1.00 
       
3.Debt- Equity ratio 59.61 16.69 0.17** 0.04 1.00 
      
4.Age 25.83 18.25 0.19** 0.13* -0.08 1.00 
     
5.Internal capability 179.78 306.20 0.69*** 0.51*** 0.14** 0.01 1.00 
    
6.Number of alliances 3.69 7.01 0.16** 0.14** -0.08 -0.07 0.25*** 1.00 
   
7.Number of partners 1.85 1.29 0.45*** 0.27*** 0.11 0.13* 0.45*** 0.49*** 1.00 
  
8.Structural hole 0.19 0.27 0.47*** 0.26*** 0.15** 0.19*** 0.43*** 0.17** 0.81*** 1.00 
 
9.Diversity of pub. Institutes 0.15 0.24 0.39*** 0.26*** 0.17** 0.23*** 0.27*** 0.14* 0.49*** 0.64*** 1.00 
10.Year 2000 0.05 0.23 -0.02 -0.07 0.10 0.00 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.06 
11.Year 2001 0.06 0.24 -0.01 -0.06 0.07 0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.10 
12.Year 2002 0.07 0.25 -0.02 -0.06 0.07 0.07 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.08 -0.08 
13.Year 2003 0.09 0.28 -0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 -0.10 
14.Year 2004 0.10 0.29 -0.08 -0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.08 -0.07 -0.11* 
15.Year 2005 0.09 0.29 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03 
16.Year 2006 0.10 0.31 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 
17.Year 2007 0.11 0.31 -0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.03 
18.Year 2008 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.06 0.02 -0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 




Variable 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1.Gross profit on sales 
          
2.Net income 
          
3.Debt- Equity ratio 
          
4.Age 
          
5.Internal capability 
          
6.Number of alliances 
          
7.Number of partners 
          
8.Structural hole 
          
9.Diversity of pub. Institutes 
          
10.Year 2000 1.00 
         
11.Year 2001 -0.06 1.00 
        
12.Year 2002 -0.06 -0.07 1.00 
       
13.Year 2003 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 1.00 
      
14.Year 2004 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 1.00 
     
15.Year 2005 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 1.00 
    
16.Year 2006 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 1.00 
   
17.Year 2007 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.11 -0.11* -0.11 -0.12* 1.00 
  
18.Year 2008 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.10 -0.11* -0.12* 1.00 
 
19.Year 2009 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.12* -0.11* -0.12* -0.12* -0.12* 1.00 
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table 2.5. Means, standard deviations, and correlations for the down-stream alliance  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1.Gross profit on sales 2,441.39 5,134.70 1.00 
        
2.Net income 746.28 3,572.26 0.84*** 1.00 
       
3.Debt- Equity ratio 56.16 18.38 0.22*** 0.03 1.00 
      
4.Age 25.72 17.32 0.17** 0.15** 0.05 1.00 
     
5.Internal capability 201.03 332.96 0.65*** 0.40*** 0.24*** -0.01 1.00 
    
6.Number of alliances 2.74 3.73 0.14** 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.13** 1.00 
   
7.Number of partners 1.99 1.56 0.53*** 0.39*** 0.20*** 0.39*** 0.46*** 0.44*** 1.00 
  
8.Structural hole 0.20 0.28 0.50*** 0.35*** 0.24*** 0.42*** 0.45*** 0.27*** 0.83*** 1.00 
 
9.Diversity of industries 0.22 0.29 0.46*** 0.29*** 0.25*** 0.50*** 0.43*** 0.36*** 0.83*** 0.80*** 1.00 
10.Year 2000 0.05 0.21 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 
11.Year 2001 0.05 0.23 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 
12.Year 2002 0.06 0.24 -0.03 -0.05 -0.09 0.07 -0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.00 
13.Year 2003 0.08 0.27 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 0.06 -0.06 0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.01 
14.Year 2004 0.08 0.27 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 0.01 -0.01 
15.Year 2005 0.09 0.29 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 
16.Year 2006 0.10 0.30 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 
17.Year 2007 0.10 0.30 0.01 0.06 0.04 -0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.00 
18.Year 2008 0.12 0.33 0.06 0.03 0.03 -0.10 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.00 




Variable 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1.Gross profit on sales 
          
2.Net income 
          
3.Debt- Equity ratio 
          
4.Age 
          
5.Internal capability 
          
6.Number of alliances 
          
7.Number of partners 
          
8.Structural hole 
          
9.Diversity of industries 
          
10.Year 2000 1.00 
         
11.Year 2001 -0.05 1.00 
        
12.Year 2002 -0.05 -0.06 1.00 
       
13.Year 2003 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 1.00 
      
14.Year 2004 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.09 1.00 
     
15.Year 2005 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 1.00 
    
16.Year 2006 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 1.00 
   
17.Year 2007 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11* 1.00 
  
18.Year 2008 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.11* -0.11* -0.12* -0.12* -0.12* 1.00 
 
19.Year 2009 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.11* -0.11* -0.12* -0.13* -0.13* -0.14** 1.00 
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Table 2.6. Two-step GMM estimates for the comprehensive alliance portfolio 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
 
Gross profit on sales Net income 
Past performance 0.83*** 0.79*** 0.73*** 0.75*** 
 
(0.14) (0.13) (0.07) (0.06) 
Debt-Equity ratio -15.14 -22.89 -51.24** -56.19** 
 
(21.35) (19.45) (25.19) (23.46) 
Age 98.27 17.26 102.59 53.60 
 
(85.20) (68.86) (63.03) (71.07) 
Internal capability 7.37 7.18 4.08 3.99 
 
(4.64) (4.45) (3.54) (3.69) 




































Diversity of pub. institutes 








Cons -2,217.80 -544.12 274.46 1,244.32 
 
(3,211.59) (2,477.57) (2,195.76) (2,106.48) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included 
# of observations 326  326  326  326  
# of firms 54  54  54  54  
AR(2) test 0.22 0.2 0.11 0.17 
Sargan test 0.35 0.32 0.39 0.24 
• P-values are reported for AR(2) and Sargan tests.  
• The instrumental variables in GMM used the first–fifth lags for the past performances. 




Table 2.7. Two-step GMM estimates for the up-stream alliance portfolio 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
 
Gross profit on sales Net income  
Past performance 0.66*** 0.69*** 0.44 0.46* 
 
(0.18) (0.21) (0.31) (0.24) 
Debt-Equity ratio 10.75 -1.40 -43.72* -49.09* 
 
(23.10) (23.30) (25.84) (25.60) 
Age -2.70 -56.97 -45.67 -64.57 
 
(81.74) (98.42) (99.91) (76.86) 
Internal capability 9.74 10.22 9.90 8.65 
 
(6.00) (7.18) (8.33) (7.29) 




































Cons -757.15 461.70 2,997.47 3,716.26 
 
(2,047.89) (2,744.09) (2,543.75) (2,713.43) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included 
# of observations 221  221  221  221  
# of firms 35  35  35  35  
AR(2) test 0.25 0.25 0.18 0.26 
Sargan test 0.23 0.54 0.44 0.37 
• P-values are reported for AR(2) and Sargan tests.  
• The instrumental variables in GMM used the first–second lags for the past performances. 




Table 2.8. Two-step GMM estimates for the down-stream alliance portfolio 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
 
Gross profit on sales Net income  
Past performance 0.79*** 0.71*** 0.78*** 0.79*** 
 
(0.07) (0.14) (0.08) (0.10) 
Debt-Equity ratio -33.27 -39.64* -71.76* -76.40*** 
 
(64.77) (23.46) (37.07) (25.92) 
Age 257.26** 234.99*** 194.02*** 174.66 
 
(118.59) (90.52) (70.51) (139.29) 
Internal capability 7.29** 7.55* 4.20 3.84 
 
(3.22) (4.36) (3.40) (5.19) 




































Cons -5,664.92 -5,867.69** -1,359.66 -1,375.93 
 
(4,759.14) (2,518.11) (4,013.90) (4,993.44) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included 
# of observations 239  239  239  239  
# of firms 43  43  43  43  
AR(2) test 0.18 0.19 0.12 0.13 
Sargan test 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.39 
• P-values are reported for AR(2) and Sargan tests.  
• The instrumental variables in GMM used the first–third lags for the past performances. 




2.5.1 Tests of hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1a, which involves the positive effect of the number of alliances, is 
supported in the vertical down-stream alliance portfolio. Hypothesis 1b, which involves 
the negative effect of the number of alliances, is not supported in any of the alliance 
portfolios. Hypothesis 2a, which involves the positive effect of the number of partners, is 
supported in the comprehensive alliance portfolio and the vertical up-stream alliance 
portfolio. Hypothesis 2b, which involves the negative effect of the number of partners, is 
not supported in any of alliance portfolios. Although hypotheses 3a and 3b, which involve 
the effect of structural holes, are not supported in the comprehensive alliance portfolio, 
hypothesis 3a is supported in the vertical down-stream alliance portfolio. Furthermore, 
hypothesis 3b is supported in the vertical up-stream alliance portfolio. Lastly, hypothesis 
4a concerning the diversity of layers in the comprehensive alliance portfolio, and the 
diversity of public institutes in the vertical up-stream alliance portfolio, is supported. 
Hypothesis 4b concerning the diversity of public institutes and industries in the 
comprehensive alliance portfolio, and the diversity of industries in the vertical down-

















Result of vertical 
up-stream 
alliance portfolio 





H1a + n.s. n.s. 1 
H1b - n.s. n.s. n.s. 
The number 
of partners 
H2a + 2 1 n.s. 
H2b - n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Structural 
hole 
H3a + n.s. n.s. 1 
H3b - n.s. 1 n.s. 
Network 
diversity 
H4a + 1 (layers) 1 (pub. institutes) n.s. 
H4b - 
1 (pub. institutes 
and industries) 
n.s. 2 (industries) 
• n.s. means “not significant.” 
• The number in the cells means the number of significant variables among the two variables. 
 
2.6 Discussion 
So far, this chapter has studied the relationships between the properties of alliance 
portfolios and firm performance in the comprehensive, vertical up-stream and down-
stream alliance network. Table 2.10 shows the results of previous studies about the 
relationships between the properties of the alliance portfolio of a firm and its performance. 
It is not difficult to see that there was a fragmented focus on horizontal networks and 
comprehensive networks. If this empirical study had been approached like these past 
studies, dull or lackluster conclusions might have been reached about the properties of 
alliance portfolios affecting corporate performance. For instance, let us consider the case 
of studying the aspects of horizontal or comprehensive networks to illustrate the alliance 
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portfolio properties affecting firm performance. If alliance portfolios from the perspective 
of the horizontal network had been studied, no analysis would have been done, because 
the relationships within the defense industry are hard to identify, due to the unique 
segmented and specialized characteristics of the defense industry. If the issue had been 
studied from the perspective of the comprehensive alliance network, not much difference 
would have been discovered from previous works. However, by examining the 
dimensions of the comprehensive network and the vertical up-stream and down-stream 
alliance networks in this chapter, it was possible to establish that the properties of alliance 
portfolio are different in each layer and in the comprehensive network. In other word, 
properties that were not significant in the comprehensive network were significant in the 
vertical up or down-stream alliance network, and vice versa. These results appeal to 
managers to think of the alliance portfolio specifically rather than broadly or 
fragmentarily. To compare in detail the alliance portfolio, the vertical up-stream and 










Table 2.10. Scope of layer of past studies 
Study Industry Network measures Dependent variables 
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In the results on alliance size (the number of alliances, the number of partners), the 
number of alliances is positive in the vertical down-stream alliance portfolio, whereas the 
number of partners is positive in the vertical up-stream alliance portfolio. These results 
imply that the benefits of external networks deriving from alliance portfolio size could be 
different depending on the characteristics of partners. In the vertical down-stream alliance 
portfolio, the number of alliances itself may affect corporate performance more than the 
number of partners. In contrast, in the vertical down-stream alliance portfolio, the number 
of partners may affect corporate performance more than the number of alliances. The 
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larger number of alliances in the vertical down-stream alliance portfolio might be 
favorable for obtaining complementary assets from other partner firms because the 
quantity of complementary assets might be important for corporate performance. Further, 
the larger number of partners in the vertical up-stream alliance portfolio might be a 
favorable factor for acquiring knowledge from other partner institutes because a focal 
firm could get diverse ideas from many partners.  
 
Additionally, model 2 in the vertical up-stream and down-stream alliance portfolio is a 
basis for good intuitions regarding the configuration of the relationships between the 
number of alliances and the number of partners for better corporate performance, a topic 
suggested by Wassmer (2010) for any future research agenda:  
 
A promising research opportunity would be to combine the two dimensions and conduct 
some comparative research on different alliance portfolio configurations (e.g., alliance 
portfolios with many alliances and many partners versus alliance portfolio with many 
alliances but few partners, i.e., many close partners.) (2010: 163) 
 
From the fact that the number of alliances is a significant positive factor in the vertical 
down-stream alliance portfolio, it follows that a larger number of alliances is better for 
performance where the number of partners is constant. Similarly, the fact that the number 
of partners is a significant positive factor in the vertical up-stream alliance portfolio 
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implies that a larger number of partners are better for performance where the number of 
alliances is constant. Figure 2.12 represents these relationships, where the configuration 
(a)→(a′)→(a′′) is better in the vertical down-stream alliance portfolio, and (b)→ 
(b′)→(b′′) is better in the vertical up-stream alliance portfolio for performance.  
 
 
Figure 2.12. The relationships between the number of alliances and partners 
 
Spanning structural holes is negatively significant for performance in vertical up-
stream alliance portfolios. In other words, densely embedded networks are a better choice 
for performance. However, in vertical down-stream alliance portfolios, the spanning of 
structural holes is positive for performance. Figure 2.13 summarizes these facts. The left 
configuration is better for vertical up-stream alliance portfolios, and the right one is better 
for vertical down-stream alliance portfolios. To explain the reason why densely embedded 
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networks are better for vertical up-stream alliance portfolios, it is necessary to note the 
argument of Uzzi (1997), which developed the arguments in Coleman (1988, 1990). The 
structure of densely embedded networks is economically beneficial because of trust, fine-
grained information transfer, and joint problem-solving agreements. Mechanisms may 
exist in which a focal firm might be stronger with strong partners, such as universities or 
research institutes, which offer these benefits through the vertical up-stream alliance 
portfolio. In addition, in vertical down-stream alliance portfolios, spanning structural 
holes is better for performance. The reason is clear from the benefits a focal firm obtains 
from vertical down-stream alliances. The key reason to ally is to access complementary 
assets (competence, manufacturing, etc.) rather than to acquire new knowledge 
(Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006; Silverman & Baum, 2002). For reasons of non-redundancy, 




Figure 2.13. The difference of ideal structure between the vertical up-stream and down-
stream alliance portfolios 
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Diversity of layers is significantly positive in the comprehensive alliance portfolio. 
Although the diversity of public institutes and industries is a significant negative in the 
comprehensive alliance portfolio, the diversity of public institutes in the vertical up-
stream alliance portfolios is a significant positive; similarly, the diversity of industries in 
the vertical down-stream alliance portfolio is a significant negative. As shown in figure 
2.14 below, diversity of layers shows the importance of balancing layers. In other words, 
performance is affected positively by combining the knowledge from the vertical up-
stream alliance portfolio and complementary assets from the vertical down-stream 
alliance portfolio that are related in practice. This means that the value-added products 
are produced not just by knowledge or practice but by a combination of the two. In 
vertical up-stream alliance portfolios, a focal firm is better able to get ideas or knowledge 
from several sorts of sources, which may contribute to value-added product development. 
In vertical down-stream alliance portfolios, the configuration that is focused on specific 
industries rather than industry diversity seems related in the case of the Korean defense 
industry. Although firms are included in the single category of the defense industry, they 
are specialized in some particular technology, unlike other industries. This characteristic 

























Chapter 3. External resources, relative 
capabilities, spanning structural holes, and 
firm performance 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter is about the role of the alliance partners and structural characteristics 
among six research streams (e.g., portfolio size, the role of the alliance partners, role of 
structural and relational alliance portfolio characteristics, etc.) affecting firm performance 
(Wassmer, 2010). Past studies about the role of the alliance partners emphasized the 
importance of having larger resources and capability endowments of partners (Stuart, 
2000; Lavie 2007). For example, Stuart (2000) concluded that ‘both from a resource 
access and reputation standpoint, large and innovative firms are likely to be the most 
valuable associates’ (Stuart, 2000: 808). This conclusion might be the requirements of 
good partners that we have understood. More generally, this logic is based on the social 
networks literature emphasizing the potential advantages of a relationship depending on 
the social and material capital possessed by a focal firm’s partners (Burt, 1992). In other 
words, collaborating with good partners means a value creation mechanism exists.  
 
The current study cautions, however, that firms that follow this suggestion may suffer 
a decline in market performance because dominant partners may appropriate a larger 
share of joint value creation at the focal firm’s expense (Lavie, 2007). In other words, 
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selecting objectively good partners unconditionally would be not appropriate for a focal 
firm. Such a value appropriation effect can be explained by the transaction costs theory 
(Williamson, 1989; Pisano, 1990). The transaction cost in alliance is like a product made 
by coordinating, managing, and controlling activities between a focal firm and partners. 
The reason of incurred costs is related to asymmetric information, possible opportunistic 
behavior of partners, and uncertainty between two firms (Tripsas et al., 1995). 
 
 It is true that scholars have tended to neglect the appropriation hazards that partners 
impose. In this regard, it is necessary to review accessible partners’ resources and 
compare the capabilities between a focal firm and a partner in order to select a more 
suitable candidate partner for better performance, rather than unconditionally selecting 
larger, better endowed partners. The relationship of the relative capabilities between a 
focal firm and a partner and the spanning of structural holes will also be represented.  
 
So far, research into the role of the alliance partners is rare since work on alliance 
portfolios is a relatively new research area in the widely studied field of strategic 
alliances (Lavie, 2007; Wassmer, 2010). Stuart (2000) also pointed out about the paucity 
of literature on the topic of the role of the alliance partners. 
 
Alliance portfolio can be classified into three sorts according to the types of a focal 
firm’s partners: vertical up-stream, horizontal, and down-stream alliance portfolios 
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(Haeussler & Patzelt, 2008; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006; Silverman & Baum, 2002); see 
figure 3.1. The overall perspective of the three levels is referred to as the comprehensive 
alliance portfolio (Baum et al., 2000). This study concentrates on the technological 
vertical down-stream alliance portfolios of Korean defense firms, in order to discuss 
external resources, the relative capabilities between a focal firm and partners, and the 
spanning of structural holes in vertical down-stream alliance portfolios and firms, because 
it is hard to define the capabilities of partners in vertical up-stream alliance portfolios. 
Furthermore, horizontal alliances of Korean defense firms are hard to find since the firms 
are segmented and specialized. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. The scope of this chapter 
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In the remainder of this chapter, establishing hypotheses, describeing methods, and 
outlining results are followed. In the sections on theory and hypotheses, identical 
hypotheses are presented for accessible resources of focal firm partners, the relative 
capabilities between a focal firm and a partner, and the spanning of structural holes; 
outlining the findings in the results sections. Finally, conclusions from the statistical 
results are discussed. 
 
3.2 Theory and hypotheses 
3.2.1 The accessible resources 
Through alliances, a focal firm can access resources that it does not itself possess. The 
reason that firms engage in co–development is that they can use external resources in 
pursuit of their goals (Becker & Dietz, 2004). External resources make alliances more 
efficient and richer in the cases where these may constitute necessary complementary 
assets (Nieto & Santamaría, 2007). A focal firm can leverage these external resources 
through the associated value-creation mechanisms (Lavie, 2007). Value–creation is 
referred to as the creation of economic or monetary value (e.g., increases in stock price, 
additional cash flows, etc.) (Wassmer & Dussauge, 2011). The importance of alliances 
has become ever more evident in terms of resource accessibility, development, and value–
creation, as well as from the cost-benefit perspectives highlighted by scholars (Gulati, 
2007; Wassmer & Dussauge, 2011). In this way, a focal firm can use alliances as 
opportunities for value–creation through resource pooling and combination. In addition, 
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alliances enable the firm to internalize external resources and to enhance its internal 
capabilities, a potentially positive factor for firm performance (Lavie, 2006). Therefore, 
the following hypothesis is proposed. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: the more a focal firm has access to external resources, the better it 
performs. 
 
However, the rapidly burgeoning literature on alliance portfolios focuses on the effect 
of value–creation, and overlooks the effect of value–appropriation (Lavie, 2007). As the 
resources that a focal firm can access increase, so it is more likely to encounter unfamiliar 
resources. This situation may interfere with the process of assembling resources, and 
increase costs by unnecessary or inefficient alliances. In this situation, a focal firm may 
not be able to internalize the external resources, despite its opportunity to acquire 
accessible resources. In this scenario, the resources could prove useless as well as 
increase costs. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed 
 







3.2.2 Relative innovativeness of a focal firm compared with 
partner firms 
Alliances with innovative partners can provide opportunities to learn new routines, 
and facilitate the acquisition of advanced technical know–how (Stuart, 2000; Lavie, 2007). 
In this mechanism, strategic alliances with well-endowed or innovative partners could 
support a focal firm’s performance. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) argued that the process 
of sharing ideas with innovative partners is likely to generate new knowledge. As partners 
are more innovative, a focal firm may learn and create more from its interaction with 
them. In their examination of the Canadian biotech industry, Baum et al. (2000) showed 
that startup firms involving with innovative partners tended to perform better. Stuart 
(2000), in a study of the U.S. semiconductor industry, also found that more innovative 
partners play an important role in delivering endowments. These works emphasize the 
importance of the absolute innovativeness of the partners. From a relative perspective, 
relative superiority of the partners also affects firm performance positively, if one thinks 
of the importance of the absolute innovativeness of the partners along a continuum. Thus, 
a focal firm having relatively innovative partner firms may be able to replicate innovative 
ideas including the process generating insightful new ideas that will improve firm 
performance. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed. 
 
Hypothesis 2: a focal firm’s performance is negatively associated with the relative 
innovativeness of a focal firm. 
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3.2.3 Relative reputation of a focal firm compared with 
partner firms 
A firm’s reputation is a set of attributes characterizing a focal firm (Weigelt & 
Camerer, 1988). An alliance partner could affect a focal firm’s performance through its 
influence on an organization’s reputation, because a good reputation is viewed as a rent-
generating asset (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990) and because of the evolution of reputations 
of partners (Stuart et al., 1999). The transfer of tangible and knowledge-based resources 
from partners having good reputations may confer social status on a focal firm. Although 
these factors also emphasize the importance of the absolute reputation of the partners, it is 
valuable to consider the issue from a relative perspective. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis is proposed. 
 
Hypothesis 3: a focal firm’s performance is negatively associated with the relative 
reputation of a focal firm. 
 
3.2.4 Relative bargaining power of a focal firm compared with 
partner firms 
Bargaining power can be defined as the ability to obtain favorable conditions in 
contract negotiations between two parties (Yan & Gray, 1994). Thus, the relative 
bargaining power between a focal firm and partner affects the distribution of rents in 
alliances (Hamel, 1991). If a focal firm has a weaker bargaining power relative to a 
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partner, a focal firm could lose its share (Yan & Gray, 1994). Conversely, the relative 
strong bargaining power of a focal firm could allow it to take an excessive share. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed. 
 
Hypothesis 4: a focal firm’s performance is positively associated with the relative 
bargaining power of a focal firm. 
 
3.2.5 Contingencies exerted by spanning structural hole 
The spanning of structural holes by a focal firm can have social structural advantages 
(Burt, 1992). Burt (1992) suggested that the spanning of structural holes is favorable for 
obtaining diverse information. In conjunction with highly innovative partners, it could 
create joint positive effects because partner firms could offer new opportunities in niche 
markets (Zaheer & Bell, 2005). In this context, partner firms having superior uncorrelated 
innovativeness could provide new market opportunities for a focal firm. Similar logic 
suggests that reputation could also make joint positive effects in the sense that a focal 
firm’s reputation is a set of attributes that observers perceive to characterize a firm.  
 
Hypothesis 5: the relative innovativeness of a focal firm spanning structural holes 





Hypothesis 6: the relative reputation of a focal firm spanning structural holes reduces 
firm performance. 
 
The spanning of structural holes by a focal firm having high bargaining power could 
produce joint effects. Partners who are not connected to each other could not share the 
information about the focal firm’s bargaining power, and a focal firm’s bargaining skills 
are only exposed in a restricted way to other partners. In this sense, a focal firm could 
gain an edge at the negotiating table against partners by spanning structural holes. 
 
Hypothesis 7: the relative bargaining power of a focal firm spanning structural holes 




The technological alliances of 44 leading Korean defense firms were investigated. As 
in chapter 2, firms that have alliances in the vertical down-stream alliance network are 
considered. Co-patenting is also used as an indicator of technological alliance (Lecocq & 
Van Looy, 2009). 239 alliances are found from 1995 to 2009 in vertical down-stream 
alliances, with each alliance involving two to six participants. To measure the decay effect 
of the alliances, their financial data were also collected from the Korea Investors Service 




3.3.2 Dependent variables 
Three dependent variables were used: gross profit on sales, revenue growth rate, and 
profit growth rate of current year over the database for 2000–2010. These three variables 
are used on account of their different properties. Gross profit on sales indicates 
profitability of firm. Revenue growth rate and profit growth rate indicate increments of 
growth and profitability. 
 
3.3.3 Explanatory variables 
3.3.3.1 Accessible innovativeness resources 
As described in the definition of alliance effect, the strength of an alliance decreases 
for five years when a focal firm has an alliance with a partner. Then, the matrix of 
relationship between a focal firm or partner i and j can be described as a matrix 
tW [ ]ijtw=  from t–5 to t–1 with the decay effect affecting t year performance (Stuart, 
2000). itd  means firm i’s resources or endowments, which is calculated as the mean 
number of patents from t–5 to t–1 affecting t year performance. Base on Stuart (2000) 
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However, Stuart (2000)’s method missed a consideration. For example, firm 1 and 2 
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has the same accessible resources base on the Stuart (2000)’s method though firm 2 has a 
redundancy alliance between partner 1 and 2 in below figure 3.2. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. The limitation of Stuart (2000)’s method of measuring accessible resources 
from partners 
 
Also, Zaheer & Bell (2005) and Lavie (2007) measured the resources by the mean 
value of the overall firm innovativeness scores for all partners and R&D investments. 
Among these researches, the Stuart (2000)’s method of measuring the accessible 
resources is the most appropriate in the aspect of network perspective. Pointed out above, 
however, it will be more appropriate if considering redundancy among partners. So, the 
concept of “network efficiency” of a firm’s ego-network as a measure of non-redundancy 
was adopted (Burt, 1992: chap. 2), and the accessible resources of firm1 and 2 was 






Table 3.1. Efficiencies comparison of firm 1 and 2 
 
Partner A Partner B Partner C Efficient size Efficiency 

















If all the redundancies of firm B’s partners are added, it is 2
3
. If the number of partner 
minuses the redundancy value, it is 2.33, which is called “effective size of Ego network”. 
Then, the efficiency is 2.33 77.8%
3
= . Consequently, the accessible resources itp¢  of 
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3.3.3.2 Relative innovativeness, reputation and bargaining power  
Equation (8) is the mean difference for previous five year innovativeness affecting t  
year performance. 
iP  is the number of patent of firm i, and m is the number of partners 






























å   ·············· Eq. (8)  
 
U.S. firms’ reputation can be evaluated by reputation score of Forturn Magzine 
(Swaminathan & Moorman, 2009). In case of Korean company, however, the data does 
not exist. So, the credit grades from the Korea Investors Service Value (KIS–Value) 
database are used. This variable is also calculated in the same manner with relative 
innovativeness. 
iP  is the reputation score of firm i. These two variables represent 




























å   ············· Eq. (9)  
 
ROA (Return on assets) is used as proxy of bargaining power (Lavie, 2007). The 
return on assets (ROA) shows how profitable a company's assets are in generating 
revenue. The meaning of having a good profitability is that firms take larger steaks in 
several projects. In this sense, ROA can represent the bargaining power. This variable is 
also calculated in the same manner with other variables. This variable represent partners’ 
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å  ···· Eq. (10)  
 
3.3.4 Controls 
First, past performance was controlled. Firms that have been good performance of the 
past are likely also to be good (Tsai, 2001; Baum, 2000; Kaiser et al., 2011). Thus, past 
performance measures for previous years from 1999 to 2009 was included. Second, 
debt/equity which is measured by debt divided by equity was controlled (Y. M. Kim, 
2005). Third, firm age which is calculated by counting the number of years after 
establishing year of firms was controlled. (Goerzen, 2007; Zaheer & Bell, 2005). As firms 
have existed longer, they are more likely to perform better owing to established reputation, 
developed social networks, brand power and recognition (Zaheer & Bell, 2005). Fourthly, 
the structural hole variable is controlled. Information travels not only through proximate 
ties in networks, but through the structure of the network itself (Gulati, 1998). This 
variable expresses the number of partner as well as redundancy among the partners. The 
higher the number of partners is, the higher the variable is. The more the redundancy 
among partners, the less the variable is. Lastly, year dummies are controlled in the models 
for economy-wide shocks (Uotila et al., 2009). 
 
3.4 Data analysis 
The data are also unbalanced longitudinal data sets where the alliance data during 
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1995–2009 considering decay effect and financial data during 2000–2010. The models are 
estimated using the two–step generalized method of moments (GMM) by Arellano and 
Bond (1991), which involves transforming the equation into first differences. It also uses 
lagged values of the endogenous variables as instruments. This procedure was use to 
obtain estimates for the dynamic longitudinal model, using STATA, version 11.0. This 
methodology should satisfy two tests–the Sargan test and the second–order serial 
correlation test. The Sargan test is used for over–identifying restrictions for the GMM 
estimators, and AR(2) tests for second–order serial correlation. The baseline models in 
first were introduced then added variables of accessible resources and representing 
differences. Lastly, the third model uses the complete model including interaction terms 
for three dependent variables. 
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 Eq. (11) 
Where [ 5, 1]








Table 3.2 presents the correlation matrix and descriptive statistics for the relative 
capabilities of partner firms and performances dataset, while table 3.3 shows the 
standardized coefficients for the explanatory variables. No models encountered any 
problems regarding over–identifying restrictions and second–order serial correlation. 
Therefore, all the models are suitable for two–step GMM. Further, to show how the study 
of the relative capabilities of partner firms and firm performance differs from the study of 
the absolute capabilities of partner firms and firm performance, six variables are changed 
in order to represent the absolute capabilities of partner firms and the interaction terms 
with structural hole spanning in the same models. Table 3.4 presents the correlation 
matrix and descriptive statistics for the absolute capabilities of partner firms and 





Table 3.2. Means, standard deviations, and correlations for relative capabilities of partner firms and performances 
 
Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.Gross profit on sales 2,441.39  5,134.70  1.00  
         
2.Revenue growth rate 22.00  46.76  0.04  1.00  
        
3.Profit growth rate 121.90  706.15  -0.02  0.14** 1.00         
4.Debt/Equity 56.16  18.38  0.22*** 0.13** -0.02  1.00        
5.Age 25.72  17.32  0.17** 0.08  -0.06  0.05  1.00  
     
6.Structural hole 0.20  0.28  0.50*** 0.15** -0.04  0.24*** 0.42*** 1.00  
    
7.Innovation resources 1.86  4.33  -0.01  -0.06  0.26*** 0.01  0.00  -0.01  1.00  
   
8.Relative innovativeness 39.56  66.67  0.65*** -0.10  -0.05  0.24*** -0.01  0.45*** -0.05  1.00  
  
9.Relative reputation 3.06  2.82  -0.07  -0.16** -0.02  0.18** 0.02  -0.02  0.00  -0.08  1.00   
10.Relative bargaining power -2.78  15.06  -0.03  0.14** -0.04  -0.26** -0.09  -0.06  -0.15** -0.12* -0.02  1.00  
11.Relative innovativeness Ⅹ 
Structural hole 
16.42  39.19  0.72*** -0.06  -0.03  0.17** 0.13* 0.65*** -0.01  0.80*** -0.09  0.02  
12.Relative reputation Ⅹ 
Structural hole 
0.59  1.08  0.25*** 0.06  -0.01  0.22*** 0.29*** 0.72*** 0.02  0.23*** 0.30*** -0.05  
13.Relative bargaining power Ⅹ 
Structural hole 
-0.80  3.29  -0.02  0.01  0.02  -0.18** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.03  -0.02  0.01  0.41*** 
14.Year 2000 0.05  0.21  0.00  0.07  -0.01  -0.01  0.06  0.07  0.11  0.02  -0.24*** -0.02  
15.Year 2001 0.05  0.23  -0.02  0.01  -0.03  -0.03  0.07  0.05  0.09  -0.01  0.23*** 0.00  
16.Year 2002 0.06  0.24  -0.03  -0.06  -0.02  -0.09  0.07  0.00  0.09  -0.03  0.19*** 0.06  
17.Year 2003 0.08  0.27  -0.05  0.07  0.04  -0.04  0.06  0.01  0.07  -0.06  0.03  -0.02  
18.Year 2004 0.08  0.27  -0.05  0.04  0.19*** 0.01  0.03  0.01  0.01  -0.02  0.08  -0.04  
19.Year 2005 0.09  0.29  -0.06  -0.03  -0.01  -0.01  0.02  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  -0.03  
20.Year 2006 0.10  0.30  -0.04  -0.01  -0.03  -0.03  0.03  -0.01  -0.02  -0.01  -0.03  -0.02  
21.Year 2007 0.10  0.30  0.01  0.07  -0.01  0.04  -0.04  0.03  -0.02  0.01  -0.11* 0.01  
22.Year 2008 0.12  0.33  0.06  0.03  -0.04  0.03  -0.10  -0.02  -0.05  0.01  -0.06  0.04  





11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
1.Gross profit on sales 
            
 
2.Revenue growth rate 
            
 
3.Profit growth rate 
            
 
4.Debt/Equity 
            
 
5.Age 
            
 
6.Structural hole 
            
 
7.Innovation resources 
            
 
8.Relative innovativeness 
            
 
9.Relative reputation 
            
 
10.Relative bargaining power 
            
 
11.Relative innovativeness Ⅹ 
Structural hole 
1.00  
           
 
12.Relative reputation Ⅹ 
Structural hole 
0.33*** 1.00  
          
 
13.Relative bargaining power 
Ⅹ Structural hole 
0.02  -0.16  1.00  
         
 
14.Year 2000 -0.04  -0.12  0.01  1.00  
        
 
15.Year 2001 -0.05  0.23*** 0.01  -0.05  1.00  
       
 
16.Year 2002 -0.02  0.11  
-
0.02  
-0.05  -0.06  1.00  
      
 
17.Year 2003 -0.05  0.01  0.00  -0.06  -0.07  -0.07  1.00  
     
 
18.Year 2004 -0.02  0.06  
-
0.05  
-0.06  -0.07  -0.07  -0.09  1.00  
    
 
19.Year 2005 -0.01  -0.01  
-
0.07  
-0.07  -0.08  -0.08  -0.09  -0.09  1.00  
   
 
20.Year 2006 0.02  -0.05  0.01  -0.07  -0.08  -0.08  -0.10  -0.10  -0.11  1.00  
  
 
21.Year 2007 0.03  -0.06  
-
0.05  
-0.07  -0.08  -0.08  -0.10  -0.10  -0.11  -0.11* 1.00  
 
 
22.Year 2008 0.03  -0.07  
-
0.06  
-0.08  -0.09  -0.09  -0.11  -0.11  -0.12  -0.12  -0.12  1.00   
23.Year 2009 0.03  0.00  0.03  -0.08  -0.09  -0.09  -0.11* -0.11* -0.12* -0.13* -0.13* -0.14** 1.00 
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table 3.3. Two–step GMM estimates for relative capabilities of partner firms and performances 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
Dependent variables Gross profit on sales Revenue growth rate Profit growth rate 
Controls 
         
Past performance 0.89*** 0.54*** 0.46*** 0.24 0.26** 0.27** -0.05*** -0.04** -0.04** 
 
(0.12) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.11) (0.11) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Debt/Equity -18.96 -18.48 -18.74 0.40 0.41 0.57 -2.01 -3.78 -3.62 
 
(25.04) (24.86) (21.26) (0.53) (0.45) (0.42) (2.10) (2.89) (2.70) 
Age 346.14* 354.32*** 247.89*** -4.52* -1.87 -2.12 4.96 46.54 52.16 
 
(180.42) (102.95) (92.75) (2.43) (2.41) (2.67) (22.76) (33.95) (36.70) 
Structural hole 1,128.11 1,519.30 920.32 12.67 -2.31 -4.99 325.02 333.87 545.06 
 
(1,145.38) (1,325.46) (1,429.49) (10.66) (10.82) (21.47) (332.39) (367.70) (551.91) 
Accessible resources 














Mean difference with partners 
         
Relative innovativeness   41.54* 22.88*  -0.10 -0.18  1.70 2.63 






























         
Relative innovation Structural holeⅩ    36.67**   0.28*   -2.57 
   (14.46)   (0.15)   (2.73) 


























Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Cons -7,430.25 -9,308.19** -5,638.34** 112.23* 30.58 26.87 -104.23 -1,617.99 -1,817.53 
 
(4,894.93) (3,638.18) (2,686.55) (68.10) (72.25) (80.82) (728.29) (1,188.99) (1,268.59) 
# of observations 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 
# of firms 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 
AR(2) test 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.19 0.21 0.57 0.31 0.30 
Sargan test 0.09 0.14 0.32 0.17 0.45 0.24 0.43 0.71 0.66 
• Note: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1  
• P-values are reported for AR(2) and Sargan tests. 








Table 3.4. Means, standard deviations, and correlations for absolute capabilities of partner firms and performances 
 
Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.Gross profit on sales 2,441.39  5,134.70  1.00  
         
2.Revenue growth rate 22.00  46.76  0.04  1.00  
        
3.Profit growth rate 121.90  706.15  -0.02  0.14** 1.00         
4.Debt/Equity 56.16  18.38  0.22*** 0.13** -0.02  1.00        
5.Age 25.72  17.32  0.17** 0.08  -0.06  0.05  1.00  
     
6.Structural hole 0.20  0.28  0.50*** 0.15** -0.04  0.24*** 0.42*** 1.00  
    
7.Innovation resources 1.86  4.33  -0.01  -0.06  0.26*** 0.01  0.00  -0.01  1.00  
   
8. Absolute innovativeness 0.64  0.70  0.14** 0.13* 0.00  0.13** 0.06  0.12* -0.03  1.00      
9. Absolute reputation 2.22  2.09  0.03  -0.07  0.04  0.15** 0.06  0.03  0.14** 0.09  1.00    
10. Absolute bargaining power 6.83  12.95  -0.14** 0.04  0.09  -0.09  -0.02  -0.12* 0.29*** 0.20*** 0.09  1.00  
11. Absolute innovativeness Ⅹ 
Structural hole 
0.10  0.21  0.50*** 0.14** -0.04  0.25*** 0.41*** 0.82*** -0.05  0.35*** 0.12* -0.13* 
12. Absolute reputation Ⅹ 
Structural hole 
0.51  0.95  0.30*** 0.02  -0.04  0.19*** 0.33*** 0.61*** 0.03  0.25*** 0.29*** -0.06  
13. Absolute bargaining power Ⅹ 
Structural hole 
1.48  3.18  0.25*** 0.04  -0.03  0.02  0.23*** 0.64*** 0.08  0.03  0.04  0.26*** 
14.Year 2000 0.05  0.21  0.00  0.07  -0.01  -0.01  0.06  0.07  0.11  -0.23*** -0.01  0.12* 
15.Year 2001 0.05  0.23  -0.02  0.01  -0.03  -0.03  0.07  0.05  0.09  -0.20*** -0.02  0.04  
16.Year 2002 0.06  0.24  -0.03  -0.06  -0.02  -0.09  0.07  0.00  0.09  -0.17** -0.03  0.10  
17.Year 2003 0.08  0.27  -0.05  0.07  0.04  -0.04  0.06  0.01  0.07  -0.12* 0.03  0.13** 
18.Year 2004 0.08  0.27  -0.05  0.04  0.19*** 0.01  0.03  0.01  0.01  -0.06  0.06  0.12* 
19.Year 2005 0.09  0.29  -0.06  -0.03  -0.01  -0.01  0.02  -0.01  -0.02  0.06  0.04  0.03  
20.Year 2006 0.10  0.30  -0.04  -0.01  -0.03  -0.03  0.03  -0.01  -0.02  0.08  0.05  0.01  
21.Year 2007 0.10  0.30  0.01  0.07  -0.01  0.04  -0.04  0.03  -0.02  0.15** 0.02  -0.04  
22.Year 2008 0.12  0.33  0.06  0.03  -0.04  0.03  -0.10  -0.02  -0.05  0.05  -0.03  -0.12* 





11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
1.Gross profit on sales 
            
 
2.Revenue growth rate 
            
 
3.Profit growth rate 
            
 
4.Debt/Equity 
            
 
5.Age 
            
 
6.Structural hole 
            
 
7.Innovation resources 
            
 
8.Absolute innovativeness       
         
 
9. Absolute reputation       
         
 
10. Absolute bargaining 
power 
      
         
 
11. Absolute innovativeness 
Ⅹ Structural hole 
1.00      
         
 
12. Absolute reputation Ⅹ 
Structural hole 
0.71*** 1.00    
         
 
13. Absolute bargaining 
power Ⅹ Structural hole 
0.48*** 0.45*** 1.00  
         
 
14.Year 2000 -0.12* -0.02  0.16** 1.00  
        
 
15.Year 2001 -0.10  -0.02  0.13* -0.05  1.00  
       
 
16.Year 2002 -0.06  -0.02  0.04  -0.05  -0.06  1.00  
      
 
17.Year 2003 -0.05  -0.02  0.01  -0.06  -0.07  -0.07  1.00  
     
 
18.Year 2004 -0.02  0.05  0.02  -0.06  -0.07  -0.07  -0.09  1.00  
    
 
19.Year 2005 0.02  0.04  -0.06  -0.07  -0.08  -0.08  -0.09  -0.09  1.00  
   
 
20.Year 2006 0.05  -0.01  -0.08  -0.07  -0.08  -0.08  -0.10  -0.10  -0.11  1.00  
  
 
21.Year 2007 0.12* 0.09  0.08  -0.07  -0.08  -0.08  -0.10  -0.10  -0.11  -0.11* 1.00  
 
 
22.Year 2008 0.04  0.03  -0.06  -0.08  -0.09  -0.09  -0.11  -0.11  -0.12  -0.12  -0.12  1.00   
23.Year 2009 0.06  -0.01  -0.06  -0.08  -0.09  -0.09  -0.11* -0.11* -0.12* -0.13* -0.13* -0.14** 1.00 
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table 3.5. Two–step GMM estimates for absolute capabilities of partner firms and performances 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
Dependent variables Gross profit on sales Revenue growth rate Profit growth rate 
Controls 
         
Past performance 0.89*** 0.85*** 0.84*** 0.24 0.25** 0.26** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 
(0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Debt/Equity -18.96 -31.64 -28.88 0.40 0.66 0.66 -2.01 -1.28 -2.10 
 
(25.04) (29.52) (26.73) (0.53) (0.53) (0.52) (2.10) (2.80) (2.52) 
Age 346.14* 407.31** 396.90** -4.520* -3.33 -3.01 4.96 24.62 23.60 
 
(180.42) (172.57) (156.80) (2.43) (2.33) (2.21) (22.76) (22.19) (21.36) 
Structural hole 1,128.11 1,599.27 -210.69 12.67 9.88 11.60 325.02 323.89 714.75 
 
(1,145.38) (1,258.10) (1,802.81) (10.66) (10.11) (33.76) (332.39) (331.30) (689.72) 
Accessible resources 














Mean difference with partners 
         
Absolute innovativeness   -40.34 -57.17  -5.38* -5.01  -47.12* -32.14 






























         
Absolute innovation Structural holeⅩ    325.27   -1.86   -66.88 
   (446.90)   (8.29)   (78.03) 


























Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Cons -7,430.25 -9,358.07* -8,932.72* 112.23* 86.39 76.33 -104.23 -599.58 -610.43 
 
(4,894.93) (4,868.98) (4,574.77) (68.10) (64.44) (61.05) (728.29) (684.00) (684.21) 
# of observations 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 
# of firms 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 
AR(2) test 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.79 0.55 0.64 0.43 0.41 0.38 
Sargan test 0.08 0.11 0.25 0.12 0.32 0.21 0.24 0.32 0.28 
• Note: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1  
• P-values are reported for AR(2) and Sargan tests. 






3.5.1 Tests of hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1a, which involves the positive effect of resource innovation, is supported 
in the profit growth rate variable. Hypothesis 1b, which involves the negative effect of 
resource innovation, is not supported in any of dependent variables. Hypothesis 2, which 
involves the negative effect of relative partner’s innovation capability, is supported in 
gross profit on sales. Hypothesis 3, which involves the negative effect of relative 
partner’s reputation, yields contradictory results in the rates of revenue growth and profits 
growth. Hypothesis 4, which involves the positive effect of relative partner’s bargaining 
power, is supported in the revenue growth rate variable. Hypothesis 5, which involves the 
negative effect of the interaction between relatively innovative partners and structural 
hole spanning, yields contradictory results in gross profit on sales and revenue growth 
rate. Hypothesis 6, which involves the negative effect of the interaction between relative 
reputation and structural hole spanning, is supported in the gross profit on sales variable. 
Lastly, hypothesis 7, which involves the positive effect of the interaction between relative 
bargaining power and structural hole spanning, yields contradictory results in the revenue 















H1a + + (1/3) 
H1b – n.s. 
Relative innovativeness H2 – – (1/3) 
Relative reputation H3 – + (2/3) 
Relative bargaining power H4 + + (1/3) 
Relative innovativeness Ⅹ Structural 
hole 
H5 – + (2/3) 
Relative reputation Ⅹ  
Structural hole 
H6 – – (1/3) 
Relative bargaining power Ⅹ 
Structural hole 
H7 + – (1/3) 
• n.s. means “not significant.” 




So far, this chapter concentrated on the external resources that are accessible to a focal 
firm, the relative capabilities between a focal firm and partner, structural holes in vertical 
down-stream alliance portfolios, and firm performance. Consideration of the decay effect 
also improves the calculation of the quantity of resources that focal firms can access; 
evidence again was found supporting H1a about the positive effect of accessible 
resources on firm performance. This result appears reasonable in light of past studies, 
since in extreme cases, the internalization of all the external resources is possible. In 
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realistic circumstances, some of the external resources could be internalized, and some of 
them could not. According to this result, the more focal firms have opportunities of 
accessing external resources, the more focal firms could internalize those resources.  
 
The results show negative impacts on relative innovativeness, positive impacts on 
relative reputation, and positive impacts on relative bargaining power in connection with 
the hypotheses about the capability differences between a focal firm and its partner. In 
other words, relatively smaller innovativeness, larger reputation, and larger bargaining 
power of a focal firm are better for performance. Figure 3.3 shows definitely how these 
differences affect firm performance. 
 
 
Figure 3.3. The relative capabilities between a focal firm and a partner affecting firm 
performance positively 
 
The same results were estimated with the hypotheses on relative innovativeness and 
bargaining power between a focal firm and partners. However, the superiority of a focal 
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firm in relative reputation is positive for firm performance. The KIS–Value credit grade is 
calculated from a firm’s stability, liquidity, profitability, growth, and activity indicators, 
which affect firm credit, through the statistical analysis of bankrupted firms in the past. 
This credit grade has close relationship with firm financing. So, the implication of a 
firm’s low credit grade is that it is highly likely to require financing assistance. The 
internal problems that the focal firm has could be obstructive factors inhibiting the inflow 
of external resources. In this situation, if the focal firm has a lower reputation than its 
partner, it could also experience difficulties in obtaining external resources because of 
these obstruction factors.  
 
In the results concerning the relative interactions of the three capabilities and 
structural hole spanning, the less a focal firm is innovative in relative terms, the less a 
focal firm should span a structural hole. Also, the higher the relative reputation and 
bargaining power of a focal firm, the less a focal firm should seek to span a structural 
hole, and vice versa. The results are shown in Figure 3.4. As a focal firm spans more 
structural holes, partners can engage in opportunism, despite the benefits in terms of 
accessing non–redundant information (Ahuja, 2000; Burt, 1992). It appears that partner 
opportunism in the presence of relatively strong innovativeness could cause leakage of 
the capability of a focal firm, because partners have a larger capacity to internalize the 
other firm’s capability. So, the result shows that a densely closed network is preferable in 
order to avoid the dangers of partner opportunism.  
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In the perspective of relative reputation and bargaining power, a focal firm should 
avoid spanning a structural hole when the partner’s reputation and bargaining power are 
lower. Since the less reputable partner could try to find the exit or solutions from a focal 
firm, partner opportunism may occur. So, it is better not to span structural holes but to 
make a densely closed network. Also, as mentioned earlier, bargaining power is the 
ability to obtain favorable conditions in contract negotiations. Although it might have 
been anticipated that unconnected partners would give a focal firm the chance to gain an 
edge at the negotiating table against partners by spanning structural holes, the contrary 
result was obtained. From this result, the following explanatory mechanisms can be 
considered. As a focal firm spans a structural hole, it is placed in a 1:1 relationship. In this 
negotiating situation, a partner firm’s own behavior renders a focal firm’s position 
disadvantageous. In a densely embedded network, however, the relationships between 
partner firms restrict a partner firm’s own behavior since there are other negotiating 
relationships with other partner firms. In other words, a partner firm must interpret the 
“body language” of other partner firms. For this reason, if a focal firm has higher relative 





Figure 3.4. The relative capabilities between a focal firm and a partner and the structure 
of the alliance portfolio affecting firm performance positively 
 
The study of the relative capabilities of partner firms and the focal firm performance, 
which has been discussed so far, gives different intuitions compared to the results of the 
absolute capabilities of partner firms and firm performance (table 3.5). Table 3.7 
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summarizes the results of table 3.5 in a comparative way. The results establish that there 
is not significant information as to which partners a focal firm should select when allying 
with partners having low reputation or high bargaining power that affect firm 
performance positively. However, focal firms all have different capabilities, and hence 
should vary the criteria for the selection of partners, depending on their individual 
capabilities.  
 
Table 3.7. Summary on the results of absolute capabilities of partners and interaction 
effect of structural hole spanning 
Variables Result 
Absolute innovativeness n.s. 
Absolute reputation – (1/3) 
Absolute bargaining power + (1/3) 
Absolute innovativeness Ⅹ Structural hole n.s. 
Absolute reputation Ⅹ Structural hole n.s. 
Absolute bargaining power Ⅹ Structural hole n.s. 
• n.s. means “not significant.” 
• Parenthesis indicates the number of estimated coefficients significant in the direction of the 
result. 
 
The stream of research on the role of the alliance partners in alliance portfolios has 
emphasized that good partners affect firm performance positively. It has, however, 
overlooked the effect of value–appropriation in alliance portfolios (Lavie, 2007). This 
study supports the intuition that good partners could simply threaten a focal firm’s 
87 
 
performance. Our findings emphasize three points. First, the focal firm should weigh 
carefully whether a candidate partner is proper and right as a partner and whether the 
candidate has any reasons to engage in opportunism in any respect (e.g., innovativeness, 
reputation, bargaining power, etc.). Second, firm should examine whether the candidate 
partner’s capabilities and alliance portfolio structure are the correct ones in order to avoid 
opportunism. Although past studies have emphasized the benefits of spanning structural 
holes and densely embedded networks, the right response can differ depending on the 















Chapter 4. Conclusions and Implications 
4.1 Summary of results 
According to Wassmer (2010), research on alliance portfolio configurations is 
growing gradually. While being confident in the completion of research in this relatively 
new area, additional empirical studies are necessary to produce useful results for 
researchers and managers in a variety of institutions and organizations. A firm’s capability 
can be divided into internal and external capabilities (Zaheer & Bell, 2005). Resource 
based view (RBV) scholars concentrated on internal capability, while network scholars 
focused on external capability. This thesis focuses on the effects of network structures in 
firms’ access to external resources, finding that alliance portfolio configurations may 
affect the performance of a focal firm depending on the characteristics of the relevant 
markets or industries. These empirical studies may guide researchers and managers. 
 
Chapter 2 concerns alliance portfolio configuration and firm performance, not from a 
uni-dimensional perspective, but from a multi-dimensional approach involving vertical 
up-stream and down-stream alliance portfolios and the comprehensive portfolio. In 
addition, it seeks to explain why “ambidexterity in technological alliance portfolios” 
exists between vertical up-stream and down-stream alliance portfolios. These results 
provide managers with good intuitions specifically how they should construct alliance 
portfolios at each layer. As regards the size issue, the number of alliances is positive in 
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the vertical down-stream alliance portfolio, whereas the number of partners is positive in 
the vertical up-stream alliance portfolio. A larger number of alliances in the vertical 
down-stream alliance portfolio might be favorable for obtaining complementary assets 
from other partner firms, because the quantity of complementary assets might be 
important for corporate performance. On the contrary, a larger number of partners in the 
vertical up-stream alliance portfolio might be a favorable factor for acquiring knowledge 
from other partner institutes, because a focal firm could get diverse ideas from many 
partners. This difference between two layers reveals a basis for good intuitions regarding 
the configuration of the relationships between the number of alliances and the number of 
partners for better corporate performance, a topic suggested by Wassmer (2010) for any 
future research agenda. Spanning structural holes affect performance negatively in 
vertical up-stream alliance portfolio. However, in vertical down-stream alliance portfolios, 
the spanning of structural holes is positive for performance. These results have important 
implications because information travels not only through proximate ties in networks but 
also through the structure of the network itself (Gulati, 1998). Balancing layers, the 
diversity of public institutes in the vertical up-stream alliance portfolios, and the diversity 
of industries in the vertical down-stream alliance portfolio can all be different depending 
on the perspective, notwithstanding the uni-dimensional arguments of past studies.  
 
In the chapter 3, several hypotheses are tested concerning firm performance, including 
the quantity of accessible resources, the relative capabilities between a focal firm and its 
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partner where a structural hole is spanned. In this chapter, the calculating method for 
measuring accessible resources is improved, and it is argued that large amounts of 
resources could improve firm performance with improved accessible resource 
measurement. This study also explored the relative capability (innovativeness, reputation, 
and bargaining power) between a focal firm and its partners, the spanning of structural 
holes, and tested their impact on firm performance within a vertical down-stream alliance 
portfolio in the Korean defense industry. The results show negative impacts on relative 
innovativeness, positive impacts on relative reputation, and positive impacts on relative 
bargaining power in terms of the capability differences between a focal firm and its 
partner. In other words, relatively smaller innovativeness, larger reputation, and larger 
bargaining power of a focal firm are better for performance. This research thus 
contextualizes and relativizes the benefits of alliances with dominant partners. The basic 
assumption for this research is that there exist proper partner for a focal firm depending 
on its capabilities. In the interaction between the relative strength of the three capabilities 
and structural hole spanning, the less a focal firm is innovative relatively, the less a focal 
firm should span a structural hole. Also, the higher the relative reputation and bargaining 
power of a focal firm, the less a focal firm should seek to span a structural hole. The 
results show that the alliance portfolio structure is also different depending on capability 
differences of a focal firm. Work on the role of the alliance partners is rare, since alliance 
portfolio analysis is a relatively new area in the widely researched field of strategic 
alliances (Stuart, 2000; Lavie, 2007; Wassmer, 2010). This result will give scholars and 
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managers new and fruitful intuitions about the role of partners within alliance portfolios 
in the context of firm performance. 
 
4.2 Implications and directions of future research 
The global defense industry has recently been reorganized with the large US defense 
firms at its center. They have grown and globalized through M&A. Recently, the defense 
firms of European countries have also begun following this trend (J. H. Kim, 2008). 
These larger and globalized defense firms are cooperating with several firms from 
different countries in various ways, such as securing international production bases, 
strategic alliances, and so on, to dominate the worldwide market. International production 
bases are sought for their cost-saving effect as well as the new opportunities they give for 
exporting weapons systems. There has been a rapid increase in the number of strategic 
alliances to spread the risk of firms and to acquire resources that firms do not have (H. B. 
Ro, 2006). Examples of strategic alliances include Boeing cooperating with Mistubishi, 
Fuji, and Kawasaki of Japan to design a wings-fuselage interface in a 787 project, for a 
new aircraft model being developed. Further, other defense firms in the U. S., such as 
Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and General Dynamics, have global partnerships 
to share the work of developing weapons systems with several firms (J. H. Kim, 2008). 
Such strategic alliances will rapidly spread to other countries from the U.S. and Europe if 




The trend of globalization in the defense industry cannot be avoided because 
economic, technological, and human resource demands are increasing for the production 
of advanced weapons systems. Further, globalization is necessary for technological 
breakthroughs, the rationalization of production processes, R&D for weapons systems, 
economic rationality, economies of scale, and successful penetration in the international 
market. If this logic is accepted, Korea’s defense industry will likely witness fierce 
competition among defense firms, personnel and production cuts, international joint 
development and production, joint ventures, and M&A with domestic and foreign firms 
as did those in the U.S. and Europe. 
 
The heavy dependence of Korea’s defense industry on developed countries has limited 
its export of weapons systems to third countries. In the case of the U.S., trading in arms 
with Korea is restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International 
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITRA), and the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). Therefore, 
the government and firms should promote domestic R&D programs to achieve technical 
autonomy from the U.S. and other developed countries. This will assist the Korean 
defense firms to increase their exports, and a positive feedback structure could be made 
by investing the profits from exporting to other R&D projects.  
 
Korea’s defense industry faces intense competition since the abolition of the 
specialization-systematization legislations. Although the development paradigm of the 
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Korean defense industry has been that of the government leading an overseas-dependent 
policy, the future paradigm should be a firm-centered technology development strategy. 
Currently, one of the major difficulties facing the defense firms is that of acquiring the 
necessary technologies for product development and production (H. B. Ro, 2006). There 
are methods for solving this problem such as M&A, vertical integration, and so on. 
Among these, the strategic alliance is considered one of the most economical and 
efficient methods (Barney & Hesterly, 2008). If the costs of managing a strategic alliance 
are lower than the costs of acquiring new skills or competencies in any industry, the 
strategic alliance could be worthwhile. Ro (2006) showed the importance of strategic 
alliances for the growth of Korea’s defense industry using a case study of the alliance 
between Samsung Electronics and Thales. It seems that the Korean defense industry 
needs to develop various technologies for entering the world market. To do this, firms 
should strive to develop their own technologies as well as growing their capabilities from 
various strategic alliances. 
 
The strategic alliance is not unconditionally favorable, but strategies are necessary 
when implementing one. Chapter 2 shows how the configuration of a strategic alliance 
portfolio should be different from the comprehensive alliance portfolio, the vertical up-
stream, and the down-stream alliance portfolio. Further, a partner firm’s characteristics 
and alliance portfolio structure will affect firm performance differently in a vertical 
down-stream alliance portfolio, as explained in chapter 3. As the results show, 
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indiscriminately creating an alliance portfolio with external firms could affect firm 
performance negatively. As noted earlier, previous studies on Korea’s defense industry 
have concentrated on the development strategies and the features of the industry at 
national level, and the institutional development plan at industry level. However, with the 
abolition of the specialization-systematization legislations, firm level studies are all the 
more necessary. Given the current underdeveloped state of empirical research in the area 
of alliance portfolio theory (Wassmer, 2010), it is hoped that the present study will mark 
the next step in alliance research. Of course, findings specific to the defense industry of 
Korea cannot be generalized without further analysis, and follow-up studies to cover 
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업  략  휴를 하는 트 는 그 특 에 라 수직 up-stream, 
horizontal, 그리고 down-stream 휴  구분할 수 있다. 2장에 는 이  같   
가지 휴 수  (layer)  하고, 한 업이 가지는 술 휴 
포트폴리 를 체  과 수직 up-stream, down-stream  에  
과에 향  주는 술 휴 포트폴리  특징  분 하 다. 그리고, 
3장에 는 업  수직 down-stream 휴 포트폴리 에 해   가지 
연구질  시한다: 첫째, 업이 근 가능한 자원이 많 면 과에 
인가? 째, 업과 휴 트 간 상  특  차이가 업  과에 
어떤 향  미 는가? 째, 이러한 특  수 에 라  업  휴 
포트폴리  구조는 달라 야 하는가? 연구 상  한국  산 업 
54개이며, 분 간  1995–2010 지  하 고,  분  도구 는 2단계 일  
률법  사용하 다. 분  결과 2장에 는 체  에  수직 up-stream, 
down-stream 휴 포트폴리  균 이 요함  알 수 있었고, 수직 up-stream, 
down-stream 에  과에 인 향  미 는 휴 포트폴리  
특징이 다름  알 수 있었다. 3장에 는 업이 할 수 있는 자원이 많다는 
것  그 만큼 내부  할 수 있는 역량이 많아 진다는 것  알 수 있었고, 
업이 가진 트   가지 역량  종류에 있어  상  차이에 라  
과에 미 는 향이 다름  알 수 있었다. 한, 이러한 차이  인해  
업  휴 포트폴리  구조도 달리해야 함도 주장한다. 본 연구  결과는 
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학자  리자에게 휴 포트폴리 를 (layer)라는 개  도입  
부  어떤 략  휴 포트폴리 를 해야 할지에 해 도움   
것이며, 트  특  연구는 그 동안 많지 않았  분야 써 본 연구  
다각 인 분  결과는 한 단계 업그 이드  직   것이다. 
 
 
주요어 : 휴포트폴리 , 체 휴 포트폴리 , 수직 up-stream 휴 
포트폴리 , 수직 down-stream 휴 포트폴리 , 2단계 일 률법, 
∙계열  도 
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